In this civil action, Gayle Lesser sued appellees, Chris S. Doughtie; James E. Crane and D. Michael Duffey; Bowmac, LLC; and Dodson Creek, LLC, for specific performance or, alternatively, for monetary damages, based upon the breach of a promise to build a fence on the land running between Lesser’s property and the property currently or formerly owned by the appellees. Each of the appellees moved for summary judgment and asserted various defenses. In a summary order, the trial court granted the appellees’ motions. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the grant of summary judgment as to Doughtie, Crane, and Duffey, but reverse as to Bowmac and Dodson Creek. It is well established that on appeal of a grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must determine whether the trial court erred in concluding that no genuine issue of material fact remains and that the party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. This requires a de novo review of the evidence. Citations and punctuation omitted. Rubin v. Cello Corp. , 235 Ga. App. 250, 250-251 510 SE2d 541 1998. We will affirm the ruling of the trial court if it is right for any reason. Nash v. Studdard , 294 Ga. App. 845, 852 1 670 SE2d 508 2008. The facts of this case are largely undisputed. Lesser is the owner of several parcels of property located in Fulton County, Georgia. In March 2002, Forest Creek, Inc. purchased nearly 31 acres of property adjacent to and directly south of Lesser’s land for the purpose of developing a subdivision “the Property”. At that time, appellee Doughtie was the president, one of only two shareholders, and the registered agent of Forest Creek.1 In preparation for its planned development, Forest Creek filed an application with Fulton County to amend the zoning ordinance governing the Property.
Toward the end of 2002, Forest Creek entered into a contractual agreement with several nearby landowners, including Lesser, which the parties intended to “govern the development of the Property” the “Agreement”. In it, the landowners expressly agreed to support Forest Creek’s zoning application during any hearings before county officials; agreed not to initiate, support or participate in any litigation challenging the application; and agreed not to attempt to prevent the development of the Property. In return, Forest Creek committed to develop the Property in conformance with several conditions, which were specifically set forth in Section 2 of the Agreement. The condition at issue in this case provided: Forest Creek shall at its sole cost and expense install a vinyl coated, chain link fence, no less than six 6 feet in height, along the north, east and southern property lines at the request of two-thirds 2/3 of the property owners abutting Forest Creek’s property line . . . The Agreement also set forth the parties’ intent that its terms and conditions “shall be binding on the successors, successors-in-title, legal representatives and assigns of Forest Creek . . . and the landowners, respectively.” And significantly, the Agreement made clear that it was meant to create restrictive covenants to the Property: