William Torres and Jack Sawyer, Jr. “Owners” appeal from the dismissal of their application to appoint an arbitrator pursuant to OCGA § 9-9-7 b 1, contending that the superior court erred in ruling that the arbitration of their construction dispute should be administered by the arbitration group named in their construction contract. Discerning no error, we affirm. Because the relevant facts are undisputed and the error asserted presents a question of law, we review the superior court’s ruling de novo.1 The Owners entered into a contract with Piedmont Builders, Inc., “Piedmont” for the construction of a home. After a disagreement arose, the Owners filed a “Motion for the Appointment of an Arbitrator” pursuant to OCGA § 9-9-7, requesting that the superior court appoint an arbitrator to resolve their dispute. In their motion, the Owners asserted that the arbitration provision in the construction contract did not specify the arbitrator or a method for determining one; therefore, they sought appointment of one of three arbitrators named in their motion. The superior court dismissed the action and ordered that the arbitration be administered by Construction Arbitration Associates, Inc., “CAA” which is named in the arbitration agreement. The Owners then filed this appeal.
1. As a preliminary matter, we address Piedmont’s assertion that we lack jurisdiction because the Owners failed to follow the procedures for interlocutory appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 b. Piedmont argues that the case is not directly appealable, relying on Goshayeshi v. Mehrabian 2 and Pace Constr. Corp. v. Northpark Assn. ,3 which state that “the grant of an application to compel arbitration is not directly appealable pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 a 4, but is instead an interlocutory matter reviewable pursuant to OCGA § 5-6-34 b.” However, in those cases, the appeals did not arise from final judgments4; here, the appeal arises from a final order dismissing the original action in its entirety, and the case is no longer pending in the superior court. Accordingly, we conclude that this appeal is from a final judgment directly appealable under OCGA § 5-6-34 a 1.5 Piedmont’s motion to dismiss the appeal is denied.
