Steven Bernard Lackey was convicted of malice murder and other crimes arising out of the shooting death of Larry Richardson. He appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial, challenging only the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.1 For the reasons that follow we reverse Lackey’s conviction for misdemeanor obstruction of an officer and affirm his convictions for murder and the remaining crimes. The evidence adduced at trial authorized the jury to find that appellant’s five-year-old son, Amir, had been living with his mother, Christina Parker, and the victim, Larry Richardson, when, on the day of the crimes, Amir told his grandmother that the victim had “jumped on” him and Parker. The grandmother brought Amir to appellant’s home and, when he arrived at approximately 2:30 p.m., related to appellant her conversation with Amir. Around 5:15 p.m., Parker and the victim arrived at the home. The victim remained in the car as Parker went to get Amir. Appellant spoke with Parker in the home about Amir’s accusations, which Parker denied. Appellant armed himself with a 9 mm handgun, hid the weapon behind his back, walked outside to the car and told the victim to get out of the car. When the victim refused, appellant reached inside the car and shot the victim fatally in the neck. Expert testimony authorized the jury to find that appellant’s gun was pressed against the victim’s neck when fired. Appellant then ordered Parker to take them to the hospital; as Parker drove, appellant put pressure on the victim’s gunshot wound in an attempt to stem the flow of blood. Upon their arrival at the hospital, appellant left on foot. The authorities were contacted and City of Covington Police Officer Stanley Moore, who was patrolling in his marked police vehicle, responded to a call from another officer who had seen a man matching appellant’s description running from the area. Moore spotted appellant and, approaching from behind, caught up with appellant in a parking lot. Moore testified that, after exiting his vehicle approximately 25 feet from appellant, he ordered appellant to stop. He affirmed that appellant “stopped immediately upon seeing” the officer’s vehicle in the parking lot and that “when Moore told appellant to stop, he stopped.”
Appellant subsequently gave a statement to police officers in which he explained that he went outside to tell the victim not to put his hands on Parker and claimed the shooting was an accident in that he got the gun “just to scare” the much-larger victim2 and was “just trying to bully” him when the gun “just went off,” but claimed he was four feet away from the vehicle when the gun discharged. Appellant also stated that, once Parker, the victim and he arrived at the hospital, he fled because he was “scared,” made two phone calls to family members in regard to his son, and “was fixing to start back walking and that’s when the Covington Police saw me and chased me across the street.”