In this inverse condemnation action, appellant Department of Transportation of Georgia “DOT” appeals from a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of Gilbert’s Auto Service, Inc. “Gilbert’s Auto”. The trial court denied DOT’s motion for directed verdict made at the close of evidence and its motion for judgment n. o. v. In both motions, DOT argued that Gilbert’s Auto’s action was barred by a consent judgment entered in a prior condemnation action. Applying the appropriate standard of review, which provides that we “can only set a verdict aside, on evidentiary grounds, as being contrary to law in that it lacks any evidence by which it could be supported,”1 we affirm the judgment of the trial court. The record shows that on April 18, 2005, DOT filed a petition for condemnation of real property in the Superior Court of Clayton County against David Gilbert the “condemnation action”2, in which it acquired .343 acres of land and certain easement rights from property along Highway 138 the “property”. Gilbert owned the property in fee simple, and Gilbert’s Auto had a leasehold interest therein. On June 22, 2005, Gilbert’s Auto filed an inverse condemnation action against DOT “inverse action”, seeking just and adequate compensation for the taking and damages of its property interests, as well as relocation expenses and attorney’s fees and expenses. By consent of the parties, Gilbert’s Auto was added as a party to the condemnation action on August 8, 2005.
On October 27, 2006, Gilbert’s Auto filed a motion to consolidate its inverse action with DOT’s condemnation action, which DOT opposed. The trial court denied the motion to consolidate on April 12, 2007, stating as follows: though the law generally favors the prevention of a multiplicity of actions, it appears that condemnation law in Georgia rather strictly limits the relevant evidence in condemnation cases and therefore separate suits for different kinds of damages are not uncommon. . . . Consolidating the inverse condemnation action with the original condemnation action would interject elements of damages beyond that to be considered pursuant to applicable law.3 On October 9, 2007, the parties to the condemnation action entered into a consent judgment, which provided that
