This is a breach of contract action brought by the Georgia Ports Authority GPA1 against Cooper/T. Smith Stevedoring Company, Inc. and Cooper/T. Smith Corporation collectively referred to as CTS to enforce a contract by which GPA leased a gantry crane to CTS to discharge cargo from a ship berthed at the GPA’s Ocean Terminal located in Savannah in Chatham County. The contract terms are set forth in a document known as GPA Terminal Tariff No. 5, which provided the rates, rules, and regulations governing various services at the Ocean Terminal, including the GPA’s lease of cranes to stevedoring companies for discharge of cargo from ships.2 It is undisputed that, while CTS was using the crane, it fell over and was destroyed during an attempt to lift cargo from the ship. The GPA and the DAS sued CTS in the Fulton County Superior Court3 to enforce contract terms which allegedly made CTS liable for the destruction of the crane and for the cost of replacement. CTS appeals from the superior court’s order granting motions for partial summary judgment in favor of the GPA and the DAS on liability and the measure of damages, and denying CTS’s motion for partial summary judgment on the measure of damages. As a preliminary matter, we consider the issue of whether federal maritime law or state law governs the dispute over enforcement of the contract. Under the “saving to suitors” clause codified at 28 USC § 1333 1, state courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the admiralty jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain in personam claims based on maritime causes of action. Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire , 477 U. S. 207, 222 106 SC 2485, 91 LE2d 174 1986; Sea Tow/Sea Spill of Savannah v. Phillips , 253 Ga. App. 842, 847 561 SE2d 827 2002 rev’d in part on other grounds, 276 Ga. 352 2003; Lancaster v. Casey , 110 Ga. App. 278, 279-280 138 SE 2d 388 1964; Phillips v. Sea Tow/Sea Spill of Savannah , 276 Ga. 352, 353-356 578 SE2d 846 2003 recognizing concurrent state jurisdiction over in personam maritime actions, but finding that Georgia courts have no jurisdiction over marine salvage claims under the “saving to suitors” clause. The present in personam claim against CTS for money damages is a maritime cause of action because it is based on a contract directly related to a maritime service or transaction —the lease of a crane to a stevedoring company to discharge cargo from a ship berthed at the GPA’s Ocean Terminal. Norfolk Southern R. Co. v. Kirby , 543 U. S. 14, 22-25 125 SC 385, 160 LE2d 283 2004; Maryland Port Administration v. SS American Legend , 453 F. Supp. 584, 589 D. Md. 1978. Although Georgia courts have concurrent jurisdiction over this cause of action, “the extent to which state law may be used to remedy maritime injures is constrained by a so-called ‘reverse-Erie’ doctrine which requires that the substantive remedies afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime standards. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 34 1963 referring to Erie R. Co. v. Tomkins, 304 U. S. 64 1938. See also Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co. , 317 U. S. 239, 245 1942; Stevens, Erie RR. v. Tomkins and the Uniform General Maritime Law, 64 Harv. L. Rev. 246 1950.” Offshore Logistics , 477 U. S. at 223; Sea Tow , 253 Ga. App. at 847. “A ‘state having concurrent jurisdiction under the saving to suitors clause is free to adopt such remedies, and to attach to them such incidents, as it sees fit so long as it does not attempt to make changes in the substantive maritime law.’ ” Sea Tow , 276 Ga. at 356 quoting Madruga v. Superior Court of California , 346 U. S. 556, 560-561 74 SC 298, 98 LE 290 1954; see Hines v. Ga. Ports Authority , 278 Ga. 631, 632 604 SE2d 189 2004.
Expounding on these principles, the Supreme Court explained that, “when a contract is a maritime one, and the dispute is not inherently local, federal law rather than state law controls the contract interpretation.” Norfolk Southern , 543 U. S. at 22-23. Under the two step analysis employed in Norfolk Southern , once it is determined in the first step that the contract by its nature and character is a maritime contract, then the second step analyzes whether federal or state law governs its interpretation. Having established that the contract is maritime in nature, then, the court must clear a second hurdle before applying federal law in its interpretation. Is this case inherently local For not ‘every term in every maritime contract can only be controlled by some federally defined admiralty rule.’ Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co ., 348 U.S. 310, 313, 99 L. Ed. 337, 75 S. Ct. 368 1955 applying state law to maritime contract for marine insurance because of state regulatory power over insurance industry. A maritime contract’s interpretation may so implicate local interests as to beckon interpretation by state law. See Kossick v. United Fruit Co. , 365 U.S. 731, 735 81 SC 886, 6 LE2d 56 1961 . . . But when state interests cannot be accommodated without defeating a federal interest . . . then federal substantive law should govern. See Id. at 739 . . . The touchstone is a concern for the uniform meaning of maritime contracts . . . Article III’s grant of admiralty jurisdiction to federal courts ‘must have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the States with each other or with foreign states.’ American Dredging Co. v. Miller , 510 U.S. 443, 451, 127 L. Ed. 2d 285, 114 S. Ct. 981 1994 punctuation omitted;quoting The Lottawanna , 88 U.S. 558, 21 Wall. 558, 575, 22 L. Ed. 654 1875. See also . . . Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co ., 358 U.S. 354, 373, 3 L. Ed. 2d 368, 79 S. Ct. 468 1959 ‘State law must yield to the needs of a uniform federal maritime law when the Court finds inroads on a harmonious system, but this limitation still leaves the States a wide scope’. Norfolk Southern , 543 U. S. at 27-28; see Robert J. Gruendel & Angelique M. Crain, The Maritime Contract and Admiralty Jurisdiction: Recent Developments Help Clarify an Inherently Confused Landscape, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 1235 2003.
