Monica Ann Krachman filed a Complaint for False Imprisonment against Ridgeview Institute, Inc., a Georgia corporation “Ridgeview”, Denise Shipman, M.D., Denise Shipman, M.D., Inc., and Sandra Ann Diehl, M.D., claiming that the defendants unlawfully detained her at Ridgeview between July 9, 2006 and July 31, 2006. After Ridgeview filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment, the trial court granted summary judgment in Ridgeview’s favor by order dated November 24, 2008. Krachman now appeals, arguing that the trial court erred in concluding that Ridgeview was immune from liability under OCGA § 37-3-4 because, among other things, Ridgeview is not within the ambit of the statute. We agree and further conclude that material issues of fact exist as to the viability of Krachman’s false imprisonment claim against Ridgeview. Accordingly, we reverse.1 Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Citation omitted. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp. , 226 Ga. App. 459 1 486 SE2d 684 1997. The record shows that on July 9, 2006, Krachman, who was approximately 17 weeks pregnant, was admitted to Ridgeview on a voluntary basis to obtain mental health treatment. Prior to her admission, Krachman signed Ridgeview’s “Agreements and Conditions of Voluntary Admission” form, which provided: I understand that I may request discharge at any time. . . . The request for discharge must be in writing and the form may be obtained from the staff. Within three days not counting Sundays and legal holidays after the Medical Director, or a physician who has been designated by the Medical Director to make discharge decisions, gets my written request, I will be discharged unless that physician determines, after consideration of the recommendations of the treatment team, that my discharge would be unsafe to me or others . If I am not released, the process for involuntary hospitalization will begin. If this happens, I will be told of my rights. Emphasis in original. Ridgeview also provided Krachman with a statement of Patient Rights and Responsibilities, which included the right “to request discharge in writing any time after admission if an adult patient, and to be assisted to put verbal request in writing within 24 hours.”
Dr. Shipman was Krachman’s treating psychiatrist at Ridgeview. Dr. Shipman’s July 9, 2006 admitting note stated that: “Hospitalization is necessary as the patient is having depression, severe agitation, and suicidal thoughts. In addition, over the last two days, she has jumped out of a moving car twice.” Subsequently, Dr. Shipman documented Krachman’s status in her progress notes based on interviews with Krachman. Dr. Shipman’s progress notes from July 12, 2006 and July 18, 2006 described Krachman as agitated, anxious, and depressed. On July 24, 2006, Dr. Shipman reported that Krachman told her: “I want to go home, but I can’t. I feel so not ready to go home. I’m scared. I can’t function here. How am I going to function at home” According to Dr. Shipman’s July 24 notes, Krachman reported telling her husband that she would not go home with him because she was scared. Further, Dr. Shipman wrote that Krachman “could not discuss, this evening, what she could do at home if she was discharged.” Dr. Shipman’s notes from July 25, 2006 reflect that Krachman told Shipman she was not getting better and was having “bad thoughts. What if I do something to hurt my 2-year-old son or hurt myself.” On July 26, 2006, Dr. Shipman stated that Krachman continued to express fear of going home, stating, “I can’t do it,” and remained fearful of harming her son or herself.
