Shirley Kelley brought suit against David Purcell, as personal representative and/or next friend and/or administrator of the Estate of Clyde Edward Turner for personal injuries arising from a collision. The jury originally returned a verdict in favor of Kelley, and Purcell appealed. In Purcell v. Kelley , 286 Ga. App. 117 648 SE2d 454 2007,1 this Court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. The jury in the second trial returned a verdict in favor of Purcell, and Kelley appeals following the trial court’s denial of her motion for a new trial. In her sole enumeration of error, Kelley argues that the trial court erred in allowing Purcell to elicit testimony in violation of the collateral source rule. Prior to the second trial, Purcell filed motions in limine to exclude evidence of the parties’ financial circumstances and evidence that Kelley may have had anxiety over outstanding medical bills. Kelley’s attorney did not oppose these motions, and the trial court granted them, advising counsel to “make sure the plaintiff is aware that we are not going to discuss anything about financial circumstances.” During her direct examination, Kelley indicated that all her medical bills were sent to her employer, GDA Motor Coach Driver, Inc.,2 but she did not discuss how the bills were paid. The medical bills Kelley introduced to support her claim for damages, however, contained GDA’s mailing address, and one of the bills specifically listed GDA in a box labelled “payer.” Kelley sought to recover the costs of these medical bills, as well as the prospective costs of surgery that a neurologist had recommended four years previously, but which she had not yet undergone.
Purcell challenged Kelley’s right to recover for surgery she had delayed for four years. And on cross-examination, Purcell’s attorney asked Kelley why she had not yet had the surgery. She explained, “Because I didn’t know the outcome. I cannot afford the surgery. ” Emphasis added. Purcell’s attorney immediately began questioning Kelley about the availability of workers’ compensation to pay all her bills. Kelley’s attorney objected to this questioning, but the trial court overruled the objection following an unrecorded bench conference. In response to continued questioning on the topic, Kelley conceded that GDA had paid her medical bills, but she did not know if they were required by law to pay them or whether workers’ compensation insurance was otherwise available to pay them.3