Following a jury trial, Christopher England was convicted on one count of driving with an unlawful alcohol concentration DUI per se,1 one count of driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for him to drive DUI less safe,2 and failure to operate his vehicle within a single lane.3 He appeals the two DUI convictions, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting the results of a State-administered blood test because 1 he requested an independent chemical test and was not granted one, and 2 he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confront a lab technician, who assisted the State’s toxicology expert in conducting the State’s blood test. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, Davis v. State ,4 the evidence shows that in the early morning hours of September 22, 2007, a law enforcement officer saw the truck that England was driving cross over the road’s fog line and, consequently, turned his patrol vehicle around to follow. After observing England’s truck cross over the fog line a second time, the officer initiated a traffic stop. Upon asking England for his driver’s license, the officer smelled an alcoholic beverage odor and noticed that England’s eyes were red. Thereafter, the officer had England exit his truck and perform several field sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, the walk-and-turn test, and the one-legged-turn test, all of which indicated to the officer that England was under the influence of alcohol. The officer then asked England if he would submit to an alco-sensor test, to which England responded that he preferred a blood test. When the officer told England that he could not conduct such a test at that time because England was not under arrest and because the officer did not have the means to draw blood by the side of the road, England submitted to the alco-sensor test, and his breath tested positive for alcohol.
Based on the positive alco-sensor result and England’s performance of the field sobriety tests, the officer arrested him for DUI. Immediately after placing England under arrest, the officer read England the appropriate implied-consent notice pursuant to OCGA § 40-5-67.1 b 2. As he concluded reading the notice to England, the officer asked, “Will you submit to the State-administered chemical tests of your breath under the implied consent law” England responded that he had concerns about the accuracy of the breath test and stated that he would rather submit to a blood test. Consequently, the officer reread the implied-consent notice to England but concluded by asking him if he would submit to the State-administered chemical tests of his blood. England agreed, and thereafter, the officer transported him to a local hospital where his blood was drawn by a registered nurse.
