Robert B. Baker has been a member of the Public Service Commission PSC since his initial election in 1992. The General Assembly subsequently “amended OCGA § 46-2-1 to establish that new members elected to the commission must reside within specific districts.” Cox v. Barber , 275 Ga. 415 568 SE2d 478 2002.In order to be elected as a member of the commission from a PSC District, a person must have resided in that district for at least 12 months prior to election thereto. A person elected as a member of the commission from a PSC District by the voters of Georgia must continue to reside in that district during the person’s term of office or that office shall thereupon become vacant.OCGA § 46-2-1 b. “The legislature made this residency requirement effective for elections for . . . district two in November 2004. Cit.” Cox v. Barber , supra at 416. See also OCGA § 46-2-1 d. Although Commissioner Baker did not previously reside in District Two, he purchased a home in Clarke County, which is in that district, in August 2003. After defeating Roger Dozier in the primary, Baker was elected as Commissioner from District Two in November 2004. Thereafter, Dozier and Eleanor McMannon Appellants, as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters residing in PSC District Two, filed a petition for writ of quo warranto against Commissioner Baker, alleging that he actually resides in DeKalb County, which is in District Three. After discovery, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Commissioner Baker, finding in an extensive order “that the undisputed evidence in the record establishes his intent to make Clarke County his residence for at least 12 months prior to his election to the PSC as the District Two Representative . . . .” Appellants appeal from that order.
1. Appellants contend that the trial court erred by applying the wrong legal standard to the term “reside” as used in OCGA § 46-2-1 b. “Wherever a form of ‘the word “reside” occurs either in the statutes or in the constitution of Georgia with respect to voting, it should be construed to mean “domicile.”‘ Cit.” Holton v. Hollingsworth , 270 Ga. 591, 593 5 514 SE2d 6 1999 quoting Avery v. Bower , 170 Ga. 202, 206 2 152 SE 239 1930. The trial court’s citations and analysis establish that it was applying this correct standard of domicile or legal residency. Its repeated use of the term “residency” did not exclude the meaning of “domicile.” “The two words are frequently used carelessly to convey the same idea, as will be found in our statutes with regard to registration and voting. . . . The word ‘reside’ here is used in the sense of ‘domicile.’ ” Avery v. Bower , supra. “This meaning of residence is consistent with the rules for determining residence in the sense of domicile in the Election Code. . . . OCGA § 21-2-217.” Holton v. Hollingsworth , supra.
