Metro Dodge, Inc. was an authorized Dodge dealership located in Snellville. Gina M. Clemente filed suit against Metro and several of its officers, alleging that Metro had misrepresented the condition of the vehicle she purchased at the dealership and had failed to pay off the outstanding loan on the vehicle she traded in as part of the sales transaction. Clemente later added as defendants the franchisor, DaimlerChrysler Motors Co. “Chrysler Motors”, and Metro’s primary lender and creditor, DaimlerChrysler Financial Services Americas, LLC “Chrysler Financial”, based on several theories of vicarious and direct liability.1 The Chrysler Defendants moved for summary judgment, which the trial court initially denied but later granted in part. The trial court also amended its summary judgment order to exclude the testimony of Clemente’s expert witness. In Case Nos. A08A0870 and A08A0871, the Chrysler Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying in part their motions for summary judgment. We agree and reverse. In Case No. A08A0872, Clemente contends that the trial court erred in excluding her expert’s testimony and in granting in part the Chrysler Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. We disagree and affirm.To prevail at summary judgment under OCGA § 9-11-56, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law. A defendant who will not bear the burden of proof at trial need not affirmatively disprove the nonmoving party’s case; instead, the burden on the moving party may be discharged by pointing out by reference to the affidavits, depositions and other documents in the record that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case. If the moving party discharges this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but rather must point to specific evidence giving rise to a triable issue. Our review of the grant or denial of summary judgment is de novo, and we construe the evidence and all inferences therefrom in favor of the nonmoving party. Citations omitted. Henson v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. , 289 Ga. App. 777, 777-778 658 SE2d 391 2008. See also Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins , 261 Ga. 491 405 SE2d 474 1991. Mindful of these principles, we turn to the record in the present case.
Metro’s Relationship with Chrysler Motors. Chrysler Motors distributes Chrysler, Jeep, and Dodge vehicles to a nationwide network of authorized dealers, which then sell those vehicles to the general public at retail. From September 2001 until April 2005, Metro was a dealer authorized by Chrysler Motors to sell and service Dodge vehicles in Snellville pursuant to a franchise agreement commonly referred to as a “Dealer Agreement.” The Dealer Agreement set forth a number of standards that had to be met by Metro to retain the franchise and delineated several situations in which Chrysler Motors could terminate the franchise, whether with or without notice or an opportunity to cure. In addition to sales and service standards, the Dealer Agreement described a number of financial standards that Metro was required to meet.
