Appellant Anthony Chester was convicted in 1994 of malice murder, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and his convictions were affirmed by this Court in Chester v. State , 267 Ga. 9 471 SE2d 836 1996. Appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder conviction and received for each of the firearm possession convictions a five-year term of imprisonment to be served consecutively. In July 2007, Chester filed a motion to vacate or void an illegal sentence, contending the consecutive sentences were void and the firearm possession convictions were illegal because they should have merged into his murder conviction pursuant to OCGA § 16-1-7 a. The trial court denied the motion and Chester appealed to this Court. 1. “The denial of a petition to correct a sentence on the ground that the original sentence was void is appealable as a matter of right.” Williams v. State , 271 Ga. 686 1 523 SE2d 857 1999. The only ground for authorizing a trial court to correct a sentence at any time is that the sentence is void. Id., at 689. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. Curtis v. State , 275 Ga. 576 1 571 SE2d 376 2002. A judgment of conviction and a sentence imposed on that conviction are void if the offense is included as a matter of law or fact in another crime for which the defendant was convicted and sentenced. Id. That is not the situation presented by the case at bar since possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony does not merge into a conviction for malice murder Jackson v. State , 267 Ga. 130 2 475 SE2d 637 1996; possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not merge into a conviction for malice murder Malcolm v. State , 263 Ga. 369 5 434 SE2d 479 1993; and neither possession conviction merges into a conviction for the other. Scott v. State , 190 Ga. App. 492 3 379 SE2d 199 1989. Since the sentences imposed by the trial court are punishment the law allows, the sentences are not void.
2. We next examine Chester’s motion to the extent it seeks to have judgments of conviction declared void pursuant to OCGA § 17-9-4. OCGA § 17-9-4 provides: “The judgment of a court having no jurisdiction of the person or subject matter, or void for any other cause, is a mere nullity and may be so held in any court where it becomes material to the interest of the parties to consider it.” To qualify for consideration as a motion filed pursuant to OCGA § 17-9-4, a motion to vacate a conviction as void must allege a ground upon which the judgment of conviction entered against a criminal defendant can be declared void. Collins v. State , 277 Ga. 586 591 SE2d 820 2004. The denial of the motion is directly appealable if the convicted defendant raised in his motion allegations which would render his conviction void. Id.; Jones v. State , 282 Ga. 568 651 SE2d 728 2007 where defendant convicted of murder alleged conviction was entered on the record prior to indictment, an allegation that could void the conviction. If the ground raised is not one which would void the conviction, the motion does not qualify as a § 17-9-4 motion. Collins v. State , supra, 277 Ga. at 587. In the latter circumstance, a convicted defendant must raise the issue in a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction, an extraordinary motion for new trial, a petition for writ of habeas corpus, or a motion in arrest of judgment. See Williams v. State , 283 Ga. 94, 95 fnte. 1 656 SE2d 144 2008. Shields v. State , 276 Ga. 669 581 SE2d 536 2003 should be read as requiring dismissal of an appeal from the denial of a § 17-9-4 motion where a convicted defendant raises sufficiency of the evidence as an issue. However, where the convicted defendant raises in a § 17-9-4 motion an issue that would void a conviction e.g., lack of venue, the denial of the motion is affirmed where venue was, in fact, proved.
