The Employees’ Retirement System of Georgia “ERS” and the Georgia Department of Public Safety “DPS” collectively “the Agencies” contend the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Robert Wayne Melton and requiring them to pay attorneys fees. We agree, and reverse the grant of summary judgment and the award of attorneys fees to Melton. In country-regionplaceGeorgiathe standards applicable to motions for summary judgment are announced in Lau’s Corp. v. Haskins , 261 StateplaceGa. 491 405 SE2d 474 1991. When a trial court rules on a motion for summary judgment, the opposing party should be given the benefit of all reasonable doubt, and the court should construe the evidence and all inferences and conclusions therefrom most favorably toward the party opposing the motion. On appeal of the grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment, this court conducts a de novo review of the law and the evidence. Further, contract disputes are particularly well suited for adjudication by summary judgment because construction of contracts is ordinarily a matter of law for the court.Citation and punctuation omitted. Overton Apparel v. Russell Corporation , 264 StateplaceGa.App. 306, 307 1 590 SE2d 260 2003.
The record shows that Melton is a former employee of the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council “POST”, who apparently from the time he was hired, was reported to the Employees’ Retirement System as being eligible for early retirement under OCGA § 47-2-223 b. In 1996, after twenty-two and one-half years in law enforcement in PlaceNameplaceDeKalbPlaceTypeCountyMelton was hired by POST. He “was attracted to the Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council position based upon the sworn retirement plan that was offered to him. This retirement plan became the primary motivation to become employed.” Melton’s employment records and pay information indicated that he was enrolled in the “sworn retirement plan,” which he understood to mean that he could retire at age 55 with ten years of service. Melton, however, did not have a position in the Uniformed Division and never had such a position, never trained as a State Trooper, and never has contended in this litigation that he ever served in the Uniformed Division of DPS. Although reported as eligible for early retirement, Melton made no greater contribution to the retirement system than employees who are not so eligible. In August 2005, Melton notified POST that he would be retiring March 1, 2006, and that he would be submitting his retirement application in February 2006.
