Following his 1991 conviction for armed robbery, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, Tyrone Brown pro se directly appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion to correct a void sentence, which motion was filed more than 12 years after the remittitur upon this Court’s affirmance of the trial court’s judgment of conviction. We hold that since Brown’s sentence fell within the range of allowable sentences for the charged crimes, his claim that the sentence was void is without merit. Accordingly, his motion to set aside that sentence was untimely, depriving this Court of jurisdiction in this direct appeal. For this reason, we must dismiss the appeal. In 1991, following a jury trial, Brown was sentenced to two concurrent terms of life in prison on two counts of armed robbery, five years to be served concurrently on one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and five years to be served consecutively for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony.1 Brown appealed his conviction to this Court without challenging his sentence, and in October 1994 we affirmed his conviction. See Brown v. State .2 In April 2007, Brown filed a motion to correct his allegedly void sentence, which the trial court dismissed, giving rise to this appeal.
On appeal, Brown contends that the sentencing court erred by improperly constraining its own discretion pursuant to the recidivist statute. See former OCGA § 17-10-7 b 1990; Ga. L. 1974, p. 355, § 5.3 However, unless Brown can show that his sentence was void, i.e. not authorized by the law, he cannot invoke the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify his sentence beyond the statutory time frame specified in OCGA § 17-10-1 f: Within one year of the date upon which the sentence is imposed, or within 120 days after receipt by the sentencing court of the remittitur upon affirmance of the judgment after direct appeal, whichever is later, the court imposing the sentence has the jurisdiction, power, and authority to correct or reduce the sentence and to suspend or probate all or any part of the sentence imposed.4Upon the expiration of this period, “post-appeal pleadings filed in the sentencing court seeking sentence modification must set forth why the sentence is void, i.e., how it imposes punishment the law does not allow.” Jones v. State , supra, 278 Ga. at 670.