Christopher D. Davenport appeals his conviction for the felony murder of three-year-old Joycelyn Broadway.1 The evidence at trial showed that while the woman with whom he was living worked, Davenport stayed home with her daughter Joycelyn. As the mother arrived home on October 18, 2001, she heard Davenport say, “I’m tired of you pissing yourself.” She found her daughter unresponsive. Emergency medical technicians responding to the mother’s 911 call found Joycelyn in cardiac arrest and she was declared dead shortly after her arrival at a hospital. An autopsy revealed a ruptured left eardrum, bruising on the left side of Joycelyn’s face, a hand-shaped bruise behind her left ear, laceration inside her mouth, and swelling of the brain. The cause of death was blunt force trauma, more specifically, diffuse axonal injury, a condition in which nerve fibers in the brain are torn when the head is suddenly put into rotational movement, as by a blow to the side of the head. Davenport initially claimed Joycelyn suddenly became lifeless as he changed her clothes and that he fell on top of her while running down the stairs to the ambulance. Confronted with evidence of Joycelyn’s injuries, Davenport admitted striking her twice, but denied he intended to kill her. Bloody clothes and a towel were found in the apartment. 1. The evidence adduced at trial and summarized above was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find Davenport guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560 1979; Kennedy v. State , 277 Ga. 588 1 592 SE2d 830 2004.
2. In two enumerations of error, Davenport complains of the trial court’s removal of his original appointed counsel. With trial set for September 2004, Davenport and his appointed counsel appeared on July 7, 2004, for a hearing on pre-trial motions. The prosecuting attorney expressed concern at that hearing that counsel was not providing adequate representation and was filing motions for dilatory purposes; that counsel had first raised an insanity defense 10 days before a previously-scheduled trial date although he had been representing Davenport for almost two years at that point; that counsel did not prepare Davenport for an interview with a psychologist or even inform him of the interview beforehand; that counsel had been unprepared for a previous motion hearing; and that counsel had filed a number of motions on the evening before the July 7 hearing despite having had three months’ notice of the hearing. After a discussion of the level of counsel’s preparedness and a conversation with Davenport in which he expressed his interest in having his day in court as soon as possible and his willingness, because of his interest in moving on to trial, to continue with counsel as his attorney, the trial court permitted the motions hearing to proceed. However, when the trial court came to understand that counsel was attempting to present the testimony of a psychologist concerning whether Davenport had a mental illness which would have prevented him from making a knowing and intelligent waiver of his rights when questioned by a police officer, the issue of whether counsel was performing his duties competently was revisited by the trial court. Concluding that counsel had made a meaningful hearing on the issue of the voluntariness of Davenport’s statement impossible by ignoring his discovery responsibilities and instructions given at earlier appearances, and that counsel was willing, in order to avoid the consequences of not having made proper discovery, to forego the testimony he had just asserted was relevant to his client’s ability to make a voluntary statement, the trial court concluded counsel was not performing competently and determined it was necessary to replace counsel with new and more competent counsel. The trial court then suspended the motions hearing, postponed the trial, and appointed new counsel who represented Davenport at trial.
