This is the third time this dispute over a Fayette County sign ordinance has appeared before our state’s appellate courts. In July 2004, Curtis Coffey, a Fayette County homeowner; Wayne Charles, a principal of Granite State Outdoor Advertising; and Tanner Advertising Group, LLC “the appellants”, filed an action to enjoin the County from enforcing provisions of its 1999 sign ordinance restricting signs in residential areas to one sign per lot and to a size of no more than six square feet. In Coffey v. Fayette County , 279 Ga. 111 610 SE2d 41 2005 “Coffey I “, the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court’s denial of the appellants’ petition on the ground that the trial court had failed to consider whether the 1999 ordinance was content-neutral and was narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and whether Fayette County had drawn “its regulations to suppress no more speech than is necessary to achieve its goals.” Punctuation and footnote omitted. Id. at 111-112. On remand, the trial court determined that while some provisions of the sign ordinance were indeed unconstitutional as not content-neutral, the provisions limiting residents to one sign of a certain size were both severable and constitutional, being the least restrictive means to achieve county goals including traffic safety and neighborhood aesthetics. See Coffey v. Fayette County , 280 Ga. 656, 657 631 SE2d 703 2006 “Coffey II “. The appellants appealed, and the Supreme Court again reversed, holding that the trial court erred when it “deferred without question to the decisions made at the discretion of the County without receiving evidence or fully considering whether the ordinance was the least restrictive means of achieving the county’s goals.” Footnote omitted. Id. at 658. The Court then remanded the case a second time. Id.
On November 10, 2005, before the Supreme Court issued a ruling in Coffey II , Fayette County amended its sign ordinance to remove the provisions under attack. Following remand to the trial court, the county moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the amendment of the ordinance had mooted the appellants’ claims for damages resulting from the county’s enforcement of the ordinance. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, and we now reverse.1
