John Carey Atcheson was injured by another patron while attending a concert at the HiFi Buys Amphitheatre. Atcheson and his mother filed suit against the Amphitheatre, House of Blues Concerts, Inc. “HOB”, and CDP Event Services, Inc. “CDP”, the independent contractor that provided security-related services during events at the Amphitheatre, contending that they were liable for Atcheson’s injuries based upon their failure to prevent the criminal conduct of the attacker.1 CDP filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that it did not owe Atcheson a duty to prevent the attack. The trial court denied the motion, and we granted CDP’s application for interlocutory review. On appeal, CDP maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that because Atcheson was a third-party beneficiary to the contract between CDP and HOB, CDP owed him a duty to prevent his attack. For reasons that follow, we reverse. On appeal, we review a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion for summary judgment de novo to determine whether the evidence of record, viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates the existence of any genuine issue of material fact.2 So viewed, the record shows that the Atchesons filed suit against HOB and CDP, alleging that they acted negligently by, inter alia, failing to hire and train sufficient security personnel, failing to warn of the danger, and permitting another concert goer to bring a glass bottle into the facility. HOB answered and filed a third-party complaint against CDP for indemnification and contribution.3 CDP moved for summary judgment, arguing that it owed no contractual duty to Atcheson because he was not a third-party beneficiary to the security agreement between HOB and CDP.4 The trial court denied CDP’s motion on this basis, concluding that “the contractual language . . . reflects an intent to benefit third party patrons in executing their performance.” For the same reason, it also denied CDP’s motion for summary judgment as to HOB’s third-party complaint for common law indemnification or contribution.5
1. CDP contends that the trial court erred in concluding that Atcheson was a third-party beneficiary to the security contract and, therefore, CDP owed him a duty of protection. We agree.
