Randall Rocky Gooch was indicted by a Dawson County grand jury on two counts of battery under the Family Violence Act and one count of criminal damage to property in the first degree. A jury acquitted him of the Family Violence Act charges, but found him guilty of criminal damage to property in the first degree. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appeals, asserting the general grounds and error in the admission of the victim’s prior inconsistent statement. Finding no error, we affirm the conviction. 1. Construed in support of the jury’s verdict, the evidence shows that, while quarreling with his ex-wife, Gooch threw a burning bedsheet on her bedroom floor, so that she had to jump over it in order to escape. Gooch contends that he should not have been convicted of criminal damage to property because the sheet was joint marital property. But OCGA § 16-7-22 a 1, charged here, provides that a person commits criminal damage to property in the first degree if he “interferes with any property in a manner so as to endanger human life.” Emphasis supplied. In contrast, OCGA § 16-7-23 a 1, criminal damage to property in the second degree, provides that the offender must intentionally damage “any property of another person .” Emphasis supplied. In any event, marital or family property partially owned by another is sufficient to establish the commission of an offense even under OCGA § 16-7-23 a 1. Ginn v. State , 251 Ga. App. 159, 161 2 553 SE2d 839 2001. “In determining whether the item was the property of another, legal title is not conclusive. Instead, the State must only show that a person other than the defendant had a legal right to possess or occupy the property.” Citations and footnotes omitted. Mack v. State , 255 Ga. App. 210, 213 2 564 SE2d 799 2002. Finally, some evidence was introduced that the sheet was not marital property, because although Gooch and the victim had received the sheet as a wedding present in 1999, they had been married only for a brief period and never reconciled or lived together again. The victim kept the sheet after the divorce, and described it as hers. This enumeration of error is without merit.
2. Next, Gooch claims that the trial court erred in admitting the victim’s prior inconsistent statement to a police investigator regarding the burning sheet incident, arguing that the State failed to lay a proper foundation as to the time, place, or circumstances of the prior statement.1 We disagree.
