Dwayne Edwards sued Brooke Lamar Sewell, Jr., individually and as administrator of the estate of Brooke Lamar Sewell, Sr., among others1 collectively, “Sewell”, seeking specific performance of an alleged oral contract to sell real property. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether the contract was enforceable and, if so, whether Edwards was entitled to specific performance. Edwards appeals from the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to Sewell and denying his motion for summary judgment. For the reasons which follow, we affirm the trial court’s denial of Edwards’ motion for summary judgment and reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sewell. “To prevail at summary judgment, the moving party must demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the undisputed facts, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, warrant judgment as a matter of law.” Footnotes omitted. Smith v. Gordon , 266 Ga. App. 814 1 598 SE2d 92 2004. See OCGA § 9-11-56. Our review is de novo. See Oasis Goodtime Emporium I v. Crossroads Consulting Group, LLC , 255 Ga. App. 375, 376 565 SE2d 573 2002.
Viewed in a light most favorable to Edwards, the evidence shows that Sewell, Sr. and his sister, Joan Ledbetter, inherited the Cherokee County real property at issue the “Property”. The Property consisted of four apartments rented by Sewell, Sr. and Ledbetter to third parties under oral lease agreements. Edwards began leasing one of the units in 1989 for $180 a month. Ledbetter collected rent from the tenants, including Edwards.