Appellant Craig Robert Chancellor, the holder of a Georgia commercial driver’s license CDL and over the age of 21, was driving his personal vehicle in June 2006 when it left a Carroll County roadway and struck a tree. He was arrested at the scene for driving under the influence of alcohol to the extent it was less safe for him to drive. The arresting state trooper read to Chancellor the statutory implied consent notice for suspects over age 21, and appellant declined to submit to chemical testing of his bodily substances. Appellant was served with an administrative license suspension form and, following a hearing, an administrative law judge sustained the decision to disqualify appellant from driving a commercial motor vehicle for life because of his refusal to submit to state-administered chemical testing and his prior conviction for driving under the influence. OCGA § 40-5-151c 2006.1 The administrative action was upheld in an appeal to the Superior Court of Carroll County, and we granted Chancellor’s application for discretionary review. We have before us his contention that the statutory implied consent notice violates due process because it did not make him aware of the actual consequences of his refusal to submit to the chemical testing. In pertinent part, Georgia’s implied consent statute OCGA § 40-5-55, provides that any person who operates a motor vehicle in Georgia shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of the person’s bodily substances to determine the presence of alcohol or other drug if the person is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.2 However, a driver has a statutory right to notice of the driver’s ability to withdraw that implied consent. OCGA § 40-5-67.1b requires law enforcement officers to inform the driver from whom a bodily substance is sought for testing that Georgia law requires the driver to submit to state-administered chemical testing of bodily substances, that refusal to submit to testing will result in suspension of the driver’s license, and that the refusal can be used as evidence in a criminal prosecution.3 The statute directs the arresting officer to select and read to the person the “appropriate” implied consent notice from the three notices statutorily provided: one to be read to suspects under age 21 OCGA § 40-5-67.1b1; one to be read to suspects over age 21 OCGA § 40-5-67.1 b 2; and one to be read to commercial motor vehicle driver suspects. OCGA § 40-5-67.1 b 3. Because appellant was over the age of 21 and had been driving a non-commercial vehicle when he was arrested, the trooper read the age-appropriate implied consent notice for a suspect driving a non-commercial vehicle. OCGA § 40-5-67.1 b 2.
1. Appellant contends the implied consent notice read to him did not satisfy due process of law because he was not told his refusal to submit to chemical testing would result in his lifetime disqualification from having a commercial driver’s license. We disagree because we conclude that, as long as the arresting officer informs the driver that the driver could lose his driver’s license for refusing to submit to chemical testing, due process does not require the arresting officer to inform the driver of all the consequences of refusing to submit to chemical testing.
