This is an appeal from the granting of motions to dismiss in a medical malpractice case. The decedent, Jeanette Murray, underwent treatment for kidney disease that included taking coumadin, a blood thinner. The malpractice complaint alleges that while under the medical care and treatment of Dr. Padmanabh Maramreddy, P. Maramreddy, M.D., P.C. herineafter jointly referred to as “Maramreddy, and the hospital, Satilla Health Services, Inc., Murray was administered coumadin from September 1999 through September 2001. According to the expert affidavit attached to the complaint, the continued treatment with coumadin caused visible discoloration, sores and ulcers on Murray’s skin as early as April of 2001. Murray was diagnosed with coumadin necrosis in June of 2001, and she died on December 23, 2001. Bennie Goodman, individually and as personal representative of the estate of Murray, filed this medical malpractice complaint on July 15, 2004, alleging Maramreddy and Satilla Health Services violated the applicable standards of care and proximately caused Murray’s death by failing to properly respond to Murray’s complaint about discoloration and sores on her body, failing to properly supervise the administration of the coumadin, failing to render proper follow-up care, failing to adjust the coumadin prescription when necessary, failing to discontinue the coumadin after Murray developed adverse effects to the medication, and failing to follow the manufacturer’s instructions and recommendations regarding the proper administration of coumadin. Maramreddy and Satilla Health Services filed motions to dismiss, alleging expiration of the applicable statute of limitation regarding the wrongful death claim, expiration of the applicable statute of limitation regarding the estate’s claim, and insufficient service of process on Satilla Health Services. The trial court granted the motions to dismiss on all three grounds. Goodman appeals the trial court’s order solely with respect to the estate’s claim.1 We find no error and affirm the trial court’s order.
OCGA § 51-4-5 b provides that when the death of a human being results from criminal or other negligence, “the personal representative of the deceased person shall be entitled to recover for the funeral, medical, and other necessary expenses resulting from the injury and death of the deceased person.” Such an action is still subject to the applicable statute of limitation. In this case, the applicable statute of limitation is OCGA § 9-3-71 a, which provides that an action for medical malpractice must be brought two years “after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.” However, Goodman correctly points out that the tolling provision of OCGA § 9-3-92 also applies in this case. This tolling provision provides that the time between the death of a person and the commencement of representation upon her estate shall not be counted against her estate in calculating any limitation applicable to the bringing of an action, provided that such tolling time shall not exceed five years.2 The disputed issue here is when the cause of action accrued to begin the running of the statute of limitation on the estate’s claim.
