Paul Reynolds appeals from his aggravated battery conviction and contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel based on his trial counsel’s failure to: 1 request a charge on a lesser included offense, 2 object to alleged improper closing argument by the prosecuting attorney, and 3 request a recharge on self-defense. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. “A trial court’s finding that a defendant has not been denied effective assistance of trial counsel will be affirmed unless clearly erroneous.” Citations and punctuation omitted. Scapin v. State , 204 Ga. App. 725 420 SE2d 385 1992. The two-prong test for determining the validity of a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel provided in Strickland v. Washington , 466 U. S. 668 104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674 1984 asks whether counsel’s performance was deficient and, if so, whether this deficiency prejudiced the defense; that is, whether there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s deficiency.Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted. Bruce v. State , 252 Ga. App. 494, 498 2 555 SE2d 819 2001. “Although the Supreme Court in Strickland discussed the performance component prior to the prejudice component, it acknowledged that a court addressing the ineffective assistance issue is not required to approach the inquiry in that order or even to address both components if the defendant has made an insufficient showing on one.” Lajara v. State , 263 Ga. 438, 440 3 435 SE2d 600 1993.
1. Reynolds contends that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to request a charge on the lesser included offense of simple battery. In order to evaluate this contention, we must examine the evidence presented at trial.
