The State appeals the trial court’s grant of David Palmer’s motion to suppress drugs and other evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at Palmer’s residence. For reasons that follow, we affirm. The State contends that we should apply a de novo standard of review. But “where, as here, the credibility of the officer is outcome-determinative,” we are required to apply the following principles: first, the judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support them. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to . . . upholding . . . the trial court’s findings and judgment.1 Viewed in this light, the evidence shows that a confidential informant advised the City of Atlanta Police Department that two males, one of whom was possibly in a wheelchair, were selling crack cocaine out of a particular apartment. The informant —who had a criminal record, had assisted police with drug arrests on three or four previous occasions, but had never participated in a controlled buy —offered to purchase cocaine from the individuals while under surveillance.
After searching the informant to make sure he did not have any drugs, the police gave him city-issued funds to buy cocaine. The police then watched the informant approach the building, enter Palmer’s apartment, and then exit after fifteen to thirty seconds. The police recovered approximately one gram of cocaine from the informant, who advised that he had purchased it from a man in a wheelchair in the apartment. While conducting surveillance the following day, the authorities observed multiple people enter the apartment and then leave after less than a minute.
