In this breach of contract case, the Twiggs County Magistrate Court entered judgment in favor of appellee Tim Nelson against appellant Junior Stamps. Stamps appealed to the superior court, but failed to appear for trial. The superior court entered a default judgment against Stamps, which Stamps moved to set aside. The superior court denied Stamps’s motion. Stamps contends that the default judgment should have been set aside because the trial court had dismissed the appeal prior to its entry of the damages award. He also argues that the award of damages in the default judgment exceeded the amount prayed for in Nelson’s statement of claim. Although we find no merit in Stamps’s first claim of error, we agree that the damage award was improper. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.1 The record shows Nelson filed the breach of contract action against Stamps by filing a statement of claim in the Twiggs County Magistrate Court. Nelson claimed that Stamps had been paid in full to install a pool and deck and that Stamps had refused to complete the project. The magistrate court entered a judgment in favor of Nelson for $12,000.00 plus $69.00 court costs. Stamps appealed the magistrate court judgment to the superior court, but failed to appear for trial of his appeal. The superior court issued a final order and judgment dismissing Stamps’s appeal and entering a default judgment in favor of Nelson and against Stamps for $28,628.06. After Stamps filed his motion to set aside the judgment, the superior court entered an order denying the motion and stating that “the intent and effect of the judgment was to grant a default judgment and award damages.”
1. Stamps contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to set aside the default judgment. He argues that once the superior court dismissed the appeal, it lost jurisdiction of the case. We disagree in light of the superior court’s subsequent modification of its initial order.It is certain that the superior court has the power to interpret and clarify its own orders. Blair v. Blair , 272 Ga. 94, 96 1 527 SE2d 177 2000; Millner v. Millner , 260 Ga. 495, 497 2 397 SE2d 289 1990; Kaufmann v. Kaufmann , 246 Ga. 266, 268 3 271 SE2d 175 1980. See also Harper v. State , 270 Ga. App. 376, 377 1 606 SE2d 599 2004. Such power includes shedding light on the scope of an earlier ruling. King v. Bishop , 198 Ga. App. 622, 624 402 SE2d 307 1991. The trial court also has the inherent power during the same term of court in which the judgment was rendered to revise, correct, revoke, modify or vacate the judgment, even upon its own motion. Bagley v. Robertson , 265 Ga. 144, 146 454 SE2d 478 1995; Bank of Cumming v. Moseley , 243 Ga. 858 257 SE2d 278 1979. However, such authority generally does not extend beyond the same term of court, unless a motion to modify, or vacate, or the like was filed within the same term of court.Barlow v. State , 279 Ga. 870, 872 621 SE2d 438 2005.
