At issue in this case is the construction of a portion of OCGA § 40-5-55, Georgia’s implied consent law. In pertinent part, OCGA § 40-5-55 provides that any person who operates a motor vehicle in Georgia shall be deemed to have given consent to a chemical test of the driver’s bodily substances to determine the presence of alcohol or other drug if the driver is arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs or if the driver is involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury or death.1 Because it is conceded that appellant Harley Andrew Snyder was never arrested for driving under the influence, the focus of this case is on the second instance where consent for chemical testing is deemed to have been given —”if such person is involved in any traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.”2 Appellant Snyder was involved in a collision while driving a motor vehicle. The investigating law enforcement officer detected an odor of alcohol on appellant as well as in appellant’s vehicle, performed an alco-sensor test on appellant’s breath which registered positive for the presence of ethyl alcohol, and concluded, after investigation, that appellant caused the collision by failing to obey a stop sign. Though Snyder had no visible injuries and his passenger suffered only facial lacerations, was alert and conversing with passersby and emergency medical personnel, both men were transported to a local hospital for treatment. At the investigating officer’s request, a law enforcement officer at the hospital read the implied consent warning to appellant and received appellant’s consent to draw blood for chemical testing. Appellant was not under arrest at the time. Ten days after the accident, appellant’s passenger died. The question is whether the State’s use of test results on bodily substances that are requested and collected for testing after the traffic accident but before a person dies as a result of the accident is authorized.3 The trial court denied appellant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the statute allowed testing since there existed probable cause to believe Snyder was driving under the influence, Snyder was involved in an accident that resulted in a fatality, and it was immaterial that the test on Snyder’s bodily substances took place before the victim died.4 The Court of Appeals granted Snyder’s application for interlocutory review and affirmed the trial court. The appellate court determined the language of the statute was plain and susceptible of only one natural and reasonable construction, concluding “there is no requirement that the serious injury or fatality occur prior to the driver being read the implied consent warnings, only that an individual is deemed to have given consent ‘when’ or ‘if’ this circumstance exists.” Snyder v. State , 284 Ga. App. 350, 352 643 SE2d 861 2007. We granted appellant’s petition for a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
1. Appellant first posits that a driver must be placed under arrest before a request may be made for the driver’s bodily substances for chemical testing. We decided this assertion adversely to appellant in Hough v. State , 279 Ga. 711, 714 620 SE2d 380 2005, where we held that “nothing in OCGA § 40-5-55 requires a DUI suspect to be arrested in order to trigger his or her implied consent to testing following a traffic accident resulting in serious injuries or fatalities.” The State may request a driver who has not yet been arrested to submit to a chemical test of the driver’s bodily substances if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe the driver was driving under the influence and the driver was involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. Id., at 714-715. In the case at bar, the trial court made a finding of probable cause. Thus, appellant need not have been arrested before being asked to submit to chemical testing so long as he had been involved in a traffic accident resulting in serious injury or fatality. See Division 3, infra.
