The appellee, Wesley Brian Stanfield, was indicted for the offenses of rape, false imprisonment and child molestation.1 At the time the offenses allegedly occurred, Stanfield was employed as a Deputy by the Sumter County Sheriff’s Department. Prior to trial, Stanfield moved to suppress his statements made to an agent of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation on the basis that the statements were involuntarily made because he feared losing his law enforcement job and he was coerced by the law enforcement officer who obtained the statement. The trial court granted Stanfield’s motion, and the State filed this appeal pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1. 1. At the outset we address the State’s right to bring this appeal. Stanfield has moved to dismiss the State’s appeal, asserting that the exclusion of a defendant’s statement on voluntariness grounds is not within the scope of OCGA § 5-7-1 a 4.2 We disagree. “Even under a strict construction of OCGA § 5-7-1 a 4, the State has a direct right of appeal where the trial court grants a pre-trial motion to exclude evidence on the ground that it was obtained illegally.” Anderson v. State , 267 Ga. 116, 117 1 475 SE2d 629 1996. An appeal involving the exclusion of a statement on voluntariness grounds is no exception to this rule. See, e.g., State v. Morrell , 281 Ga. 152 2 635 SE2d 716 2006.
2. “In reviewing a trial court’s determination regarding whether a statement is voluntary, we defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous, but we review de novo the trial court’s application of the law to the undisputed facts.” State v. Aiken , 282 Ga. 132, 136 n.21 646 SE2d 222 2007. Applying the “totality of the circumstances” test recently adopted by our Supreme Court in Aiken for determining whether the statements that a public employee makes during an investigation into his activities are voluntary, we hold that the trial court properly excluded Stanfield’s statement. See Garrity v. New Jersey , 385 U. S. 493 87 SC 616, 17 LE2d 562 1967.
