Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. “Granite State” is in the business of buying and leasing land for the purpose of erecting signs and billboards displaying both commercial and noncommercial messages. In May and June of 2003, Granite State submitted three applications to the City of Roswell “City” to construct billboard signs, each 672 square feet in area and 70 feet in height, at different locations within the City. The City rejected each application because the sign ordinance in place at the time limited off-premises signs to a maximum area of 128 square feet and 12 feet in height and because the applications were incomplete. On July 16, 2003, the City enacted a moratorium on the issuance of sign permits effective until September 15, 2003. The purpose of the moratorium was to allow the City time to draft and implement an amended sign ordinance. Granite State alleges it attempted to submit applications for similarly-sized signs during the moratorium and the City did not accept any of its sign applications for processing. After its applications were rejected by the City, Granite State brought suit, contending that the City’s entire sign ordinance, as it existed in April 2003, was unconstitutional. The trial court denied Granite State’s motion for partial summary judgment and granted the City’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Granite State now alleges several enumerations of error concerning its constitutional challenge to the City’s April 2003 sign ordinance.
1. Granite State argues that the trial court erred when, by relying on the decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit “Eleventh Circuit” in Granite State Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Clearwater , 351 F3d 1112 11th Cir. 2003 and in KH Outdoor, LLC v. City of Trussville , 458 F3d 1261 11th Cir. 2006, it limited the extent of Granite State’s standing to challenging, either as applied or facially, only those provisions of the ordinance by which Granite State was injured in fact. Under federal jurisprudence, there are three constitutional requirements for obtaining standing: 1 an injury in fact; 2 a causal connection between the injury and the causal conduct; and 3 the likelihood that the injury will be redressed with a favorable decision. Bennett v. Spear , 520 U.S. 154, 162 117 SC 1154, 132 LE2d 281 1997; Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife , 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 112 SC 2130, 119 LE2d 351 1992. In addition to the constitutional requirements for standing, there is a subset of “prudential” standing requirements that have been developed by the United States Supreme Court. Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 750-51 104 SC 3315, 82 LE2d 556 1984. One of these prudential standing requirements is that a party is limited to asserting its own rights and not that of third parties. Id.1 The federal courts have carved out an exception to this particular prudential standing requirement in free speech cases, adopting what is known as the overbreadth doctrine. Clearwater , 351 F3d at 1116.
