We granted a discretionary application in this case to determine whether the superior court properly ruled that a 1989 amendment to OCGA § 34-9-13 e violated Article III, Section V, Paragraph III of the Georgia Constitution of 1983 because that amendment effected a substantive change of law not contemplated by the title of the act containing the amendment. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. OCGA § 34-9-13 e places a limit on the amount of time that an insurer must pay worker’s compensation death benefits to a surviving spouse or partial dependent. Prior to 1989, this statute provided: “The dependency of a spouse and a partial dependent shall terminate at age 65 or after payment of 400 weeks of benefits, whichever is greater .”Emphasis supplied. Ga. L. 1989, p.14, § 34. In 1989, however, a code re-enactment was passed, altering the language of OCGA § 34-9-13 e. At the time of her husband’s on-the-job death on January 16, 1990, Ruby Chinn’s death benefits as a surviving spouse were subject to this 1989 amendment, which provided: “The dependency of a spouse and a partial dependent shall terminate at age 65 or after payment of 400 weeks of benefits, whichever occurs first .” Emphasis supplied. Id. Effective July 1, 1990, OCGA § 34-9-13 e was amended again to provide: “The dependency of a spouse and of a partial dependent shall terminate at age 65 or after payment of 400 weeks of benefits, whichever provides greater benefits .” Emphasis supplied. Ga. L. 1990, p. 1409, § 1.
After Chinn had been paid benefits for approximately 13 years, the Georgia Insurers Insolvency Pool began handling Chinn’s claim, and it suspended Chinn’s benefits, asserting that she had been paid well beyond the required 400 weeks under the language of the 1989 amendment. Thereafter, Chinn filed a motion for reinstatement of her benefits and argued that the version of OCGA § 34-9-13 e applicable to her was, among other things, unconstitutional because it incorporated a substantive change in the law not contemplated by the title of the Act creating that change. See Ga. Const. of 1983 Art. III, Sec. V, Para. III “No bill shall pass which refers to more than one subject matter or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof.”
