Mahmoud Mohmed Hafez and his wife Christy Darlene Pressley were indicted for the offenses of false imprisonment Count 1, first degree cruelty to children Counts 2 and 4 and second degree cruelty to children Counts 7 and 8. Hafez was also indicted for two additional counts of first degree cruelty to children Counts 3 and5 and battery under the family violence act Count 6. They were convicted on all counts. They appeal following the denial of their motion for new trial. We affirm. 1. Defendants first contend that the trial court erred by failing to grant their general demurrer to Counts 7 and 8 of the indictment. Citing Robinson v. State , 256 Ga. 564 350 SE2d 464 1986, they argue that they were tried under an indictment that charged them with a violation of law that had been repealed without a savings clause by the General Assembly prior to their trial. But Robinson is not controlling here. As our Supreme Court explained in Daker v. Williams , 279 Ga. 782 621 SE2d 449 2005:In general, “when a statute making described conduct a crime is repealed prior to final judgment on a conviction, the repeal ends the prosecution if the legislature has not provided otherwise in a saving clause.” Robinson v. State , 256 Ga. 564, 565 350 SE2d 464 1986. See also Gonzalez v. Abbott , 262 Ga. 671 425 SE2d 272 1993; Bassett v. Lemacks , 258 Ga. 367 370 SE2d 146 1988. In other words, if, due to a statutory amendment prior to the entry of a final judgment on a conviction, the actions for which a defendant was indicted no longer constitute a crime, the prior conviction is abated in the absence of a savings clause providing otherwise. On the other hand, a prosecution may continue towards a final disposition where the actions for which the defendant was indicted were not decriminalized by the subsequent statutory amendment. A conviction may stand if it was authorized both under the original definition of the crime and the revised definition contained in the statutory amendment.Id. at. 784-785.
In this case, the statutory amendment did not decriminalize the actions for which the defendants were indicted. The result of the amendment here was simply to move the language formerly found in subsection c of OCGA § 16-5-70 to subsection d and change the conduct described therein from second degree to third degree child cruelty. Ga. L. 2004, p. 57, § 3. The conduct for which defendants were indicted and convicted remained a crime both before and after the enactment of the statutory amendment. Accordingly, this enumeration is without merit.
