This is the third appearance of this tax sale before this Court. In Davis v. Harpagon Company, LLC , 281 Ga. 250 637 SE2d 1 2006, we set forth the general facts of this case as follows:The record shows that, around January 7, 1997, the DeKalb County Tax Commissioner issued a writ of execution, or fieri facias fi. fa., based on Davis’ failure to pay the 1996 ad valorem property tax due on her home. On April 16, 1997, the Tax Commissioner transferred the fi. fa. to MIICA, a third-party corporation. MIICA, in turn, apparently transferred the fi. fa. to Agio Corporation, which sought out a levy of Davis’ property. On August 6, 2002, a tax sale was conducted, and Davis’ property was sold to an affiliate of the Harpagon Company, LLC, the defendant herein. After waiting the required year following the tax sale, see OCGA § 48-4-45a, Harpagon notified Davis of the barment of her right to redeem the property through a private process server. Davis, however, failed to redeem the property by paying the statutory redemption amount. OCGA § 48-4-42.On April 21, 2004, Harpagon filed a petition to quiet title pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-40. The case was presided over by a special master, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing, the special master determined that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding whether there had been a proper levy on the property. The special master further determined that, contrary to Davis’ contentions, she had sufficiently been placed on notice of both the transfer of the fi. fa. to Agio Corporation and the barment of her right of redemption. Davis chose to appeal this decision, filing a notice of appeal on September 2, 2005. Footnotes omitted. Davis challenged almost every aspect of the tax sale of her home, including whether the levy had been properly entered in the DeKalb County Sheriff’s records in accordance with OCGA § 9-13-12. After reviewing all of the claims, this Court determined that, solely with regard to whether there had been a proper levy on the property, there appeared to be some question of fact based on OCGA § 9-11-30 b 6 deposition testimony from Dorcas Y. Jernigan, the civil process coordinator who testified as the Sheriff’s representative. After the case returned to the trial court, Harpagon filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of the levy’s propriety and attached to their motion affidavits from representatives of the Sheriff indicating that the levy had properly occurred. Over Davis’ objections, the trial court considered these affidavits and exhibits. The affidavits in question were from Rebecca Wilkerson, who was the civil process coordinator at the time that the tax sale of Davis’ home took place, and Jernigan, who was Wilkerson’s successor.1 Wilkerson testified by affidavit that she caused a deputy sheriff to tack a Notice of Execution of Levy to Davis’ door, she confirmed with the deputy that he did so, she directed that a 20-Day and a 10-Day Notice be sent by certified mail to Davis informing her of the levy, and that she made the required entry of the levy in the Sheriff’s Execution and Sale docket. Jernigan’s affidavit confirmed these facts. In addition, a number of exhibits were attached showing that the levy on Davis’ home had, in fact, occurred. The trial court, therefore, granted Harpagon’s motion for summary judgment, and Davis appeals.
1. An entry of levy in the records of a sheriff is the sheriff’s declaration that the property has been officially seized for the purposes of a tax sale. See, e.g., Head v. Lee , 203 Ga. 191 3 45 SE2d 666 1947. OCGA § 9-13-12 provides: “The officer making a levy shall enter the same on the process by virtue of which levy is made and in the entry shall plainly describe the property levied on and the amount of the interest of defendant therein.” In their affidavits accompanying Harpagon’s motion for summary judgment, Wilkerson and Jernigan stated that: 1 a sheriff’s deputy tacked a notice of the levy on Davis’ home;2 2 20-day and 10-day notices were sent to Davis by certified mail;3 3 a notice of levy and sale was published in a local newspaper;4 and 4 a notation with a full legal description of the property and the amount of the interest therein was entered in the Sheriff’s records that the property had been levied upon and was subject to sale.5 In addition to this affidavit testimony, exhibits were also presented which included certified mail receipts of the 20-day and 10-day notices and a photocopy of a page in the Sheriff’s file on which the levy was properly noted. This evidence showed that the levy had been entered in the records of the Sheriff and that the property had been officially seized for the purposes of a tax sale. Given the exhibits from the Sheriff’s file, no question of fact remains as to whether the Sheriff officially seized the property for purposes of a tax sale.
