In 1999, Bonnie Harbuck purchased and built a home on Lot 4, Block “A” of a subdivision called Ashley Oaks in Houston County. Great Oak Way is a road that runs alongside the front of Harbuck’s property. In 2006, appellee Governor’s Estate, LLC “Governor’s Estate” began developing land adjacent to Harbuck’s property. As part of the development, Governor’s Estate sought to complete the unpaved portion of Great Oak Way to provide access to its development. Harbuck filed a petition to establish title to the unpaved portion of Great Oak Way. A special master ruled that appellees Houston County and Governor’s Estate were entitled to notice of the action and they became parties. In his recommendation to the trial court, the special master found that Harbuck could not sue a subdivision of the state for adverse possession and that Harbuck did not have color of title. The special master also found that, to avoid dismissal, Harbuck would have to show that the right of way was never dedicated, that Houston County failed to accept the dedication, or that Houston County abandoned the right of way. The special master left these issues to the trial court for disposition. After the special master’s report was issued, appellees moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding there were no issues of fact concerning color of title, dedication and acceptance, or abandonment. On appeal, Harbuck contends that it was erroneous for the trial court, as opposed to the special master, to rule on the motions for summary judgment, that appellees lacked standing, and that the trial court erred in failing to recuse the special master. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. Harbuck’s assertion that only the special master had jurisdiction to consider and rule upon appellees’ motions for summary judgment is without merit. In quiet title actions, a special master exercises jurisdiction to “ascertain the validity. . . of petitioner’s title” OCGA § 23-3-66, but there is no authority divesting the trial court’s overall jurisdiction of the case. Eardley v. McGreevy , 279 Ga. 562 2 615 SE2d 744 2005 “in submitting a quiet title case to a special master, the trial court does not cede jurisdiction to render a final decision”; Heath v. Stinson , 238 Ga. 364 233 SE2d 178 1977 special master could not grant summary judgment because OCGA § 23-3-67 gives only the trial court authority to issue the final decree. Therefore, it was not reversible error for the trial court to consider and rule upon appellees’ motions for summary judgment which finally terminated the action.
