Appellant Luis E. Rivera and Appellee Martha L. Rivera were divorced in 2006. In relevant part, the final divorce decree required Appellant to pay Appellee “the sum of $500.00 per month as alimony . . . for a total of 60 months and a total payment of $30,000.00.” This provision was based upon a jury verdict which left blank that portion of the verdict form dealing with lump sum and in-kind alimony, and which awarded Appellee “periodic alimony payments as follows: the word “month” being circled $500.00 per month for 60 months. For a total of $30,000.00.” In 2007, Appellant filed a motion for modification of alimony, which the trial court dismissed, stating “that the alimony sought to be modified was found to be lump sum alimony and non-modifiable . . . .” Appellant appeals from this order pursuant to our grant of his application for discretionary appeal. Appellant relies on the jury’s identification of the award as “periodic” alimony. However, “in prior opinions, we have made it clear that in reviewing awards in divorce judgments, this Court will ascertain the nature of the awards as a matter of law, and on the basis of substance rather than of labels. Cit.” Andrews v. Whitaker , 265 Ga. 76 1 453 SE2d 735 1995. See also Sapp v. Sapp , 259 Ga. 238, 240 3 378 SE2d 674 1989; Stone v. Stone , 254 Ga. 519 1 330 SE2d 887 1985; Nash v. Nash , 244 Ga. 749 1 262 SE2d 64 1979 applying a formula from previous cases rather than relying on the language of the verdict awarding “permanent” alimony, disapproved on other grounds, Winokur v. Winokur , 258 Ga. 88, 90 1 365 SE2d 94 1988. Compare Metzler v. Metzler , 267 Ga. 892, 893 2 485 SE2d 459 1997 where “the jury not only denominated its award as ‘periodic alimony,’ it also specifically conditioned its award upon the survival of both parties,” and this Court wholly relied on that condition of survivorship in holding that the award was indeed for periodic alimony.
In ascertaining the nature of the award at issue in this case, two rules are applicable. First, “an obligation is considered lump-sum alimony if it states the exact number and amount of payments ‘without other limitations, conditions or statements of intent.’ Cit.” Dillard v. Dillard , 265 Ga. 478, 479 458 SE2d 102 1995. See also Shepherd v. Collins , 283 Ga. 124, 125 657 SE2d 197 2008; Winokur v. Winokur , supra disapproving Nash on this point. Second, “a decree specifying periodic payments to be made until a given sum i.e., an amount stated has been paid is division of property or payment of corpus and is not revisable. Cits.” Nash v. Nash , supra at 750 1. See also Taulbee v. Taulbee , 243 Ga. 52, 53 252 SE2d 481 1979; Dan E. McConaughey, Ga. Divorce, Alimony and Child Custody § 16-6, p. 689 2007-2008 ed..
