Alan F. Beneke appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for summary judgment, arguing that the two-year statute of limitation had run by the time plaintiff Patricia Parker filed her action against him approximately two years and two weeks after the subject auto collision. She argues that the statute had been tolled under OCGA § 9-3-99 until the “following too closely” charge against Beneke was resolved. The issue is whether OCGA § 9-3-99 tolled the running of the statute of limitation for this “Uniform Rules of the Road” violation pending the disposition of the traffic citation issued against Beneke. The trial court denied Beneke’s motion and held that the statute of limitation on Parker’s complaint was tolled under OCGA § 9-3-99. We affirm the denial of summary judgment; however, we vacate that portion of the summary judgment order that purports to make a final finding of fact as to whether the tolling occurred. Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. OCGA § 9-11-56 c. A de novo standard of review applies to an appeal from a denial of summary judgment, and we view the evidence, and all reasonable conclusions and inferences drawn from it, in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Matjoulis v. Integon Gen. Ins. Corp .1
So viewed, the evidence shows that on April 27, 2005, Beneke rear-ended the vehicle in which Parker was a passenger, overturning Parker’s vehicle and causing her serious injury. Beneke was cited for following too closely,2 which traffic citation was not resolved until Beneke’s bond forfeiture on May 19, 2005.3 On May 11, 2007, Parker4 sued Beneke for negligence in Long County Superior Court, seeking to recover for her injuries. Beneke moved for summary judgment, contending that the two-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-33 barred the action. The trial court granted Beneke’s motion for summary judgment on December 18, 2007. On January 11, 2008, Parker submitted additional evidence to the trial court, showing the disposition of the traffic charge on May 19, 2005. Parker moved the trial court to reconsider its prior ruling, contending that OCGA § 9-3-99 tolled the statute of limitation until the final disposition of the traffic charge on May 19, 2005. Reconsidering its December 18 ruling, the trial court vacated its original order and denied summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that OCGA § 9-3-99 applied to toll the statute of limitation. We granted Beneke leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal.
