Maples v. State

Following his guilty plea to armed robbery, Donald Maples moved to withdraw that plea, claiming that he was misled into believing that his 20-year sentence would run concurrently with an anticipated sentence to be imposed by Tennessee for violating parole. The court found that the sentences were indeed running concurrently and denied the motion to withdraw, which ruling Maples appeals. Discerning no error, we affirm. Faced with a videotape of the crime, his fingerprints at the scene, his own confession, an eyewitness who could identify him, and his own criminal record of seventeen similar felonies which could increase his sentence, Maples decided on the day of trial to plead guilty to robbing a victim by use of a handgun. As per the negotiated plea, the Dade County Superior Court judge specified that the 20-year sentence would run concurrently with any other sentences being served or which might be imposed by Tennessee for any parole violation arising from the Georgia robbery. When Tennessee did not extradite Maples to hold a hearing on his parole violation, Maples moved to withdraw his Georgia guilty plea, arguing that contrary to the agreement, his time in a Georgia prison was not running concurrently with his anticipated but not yet imposed Tennessee sentence. Following a hearing, the trial court denied his motion to withdraw, giving rise to this appeal.

1. We first hold that procedural grounds supported the trial court’s denial of Maples’s motion to withdraw. Sentenced on January 28, 1998 pursuant to his guilty plea, Maples did not move to withdraw his plea until July 11, 2001, which was well beyond the term of court in which he was sentenced. See OCGA § 15-6-3 22 C Dade County Superior Court terms commence in April and October of each year. “It is well settled that a trial court does not have jurisdiction to entertain a motion to withdraw a guilty plea filed after the term of court in which the defendant was sentenced under the plea.” Smith v. State .1 At this point, the proper recourse is through habeas corpus proceedings. Id. at 376, fn. 1.