Following a jury trial, Nathaniel R. Dew was convicted on two counts of rape,1 two counts of incest,2 two counts of aggravated child molestation,3 and four counts of child molestation.4 He appeals his conviction and the denial of his motion for new trial, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to two of the counts of child molestation and further arguing that the trial court erred in failing to give limiting instructions regarding the use of the term “rape” and in failing to merge his conviction on one of the counts of incest into his conviction on one of the counts of rape. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm. 1. We first address Dew’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence as to two of the child molestation counts. “On appeal from a criminal conviction, the evidence must be construed in a light most favorable to the verdict and Dew no longer enjoys a presumption of innocence.” Punctuation omitted. Berry v. State .5 In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we do not weigh the evidence or determine witness credibility, but only determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty of the charged offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia .6
So viewed, the record shows that S. D. is Dew’s daughter. On the morning of February 4, 2006, S. D., who was 14 years-old at the time, was sitting on a sofa in her living room watching television when Dew pulled her onto his lap, pushed aside her underwear, and attempted to have sexual intercourse with her. S. D. struggled against him, and Dew eventually stopped. Later that same day, S. D. had fallen asleep in her parents’ upstairs bedroom but awoke when she heard Dew coming up the stairs. Initially Dew went into the bathroom, but after a few minutes, he came back into the bedroom wearing only a shirt. He then grabbed S. D. by the legs and forcibly removed her pants and underwear. Although S. D. struggled against him, Dew held her down and forced her to engage in intercourse.