This is the second appearance of this case before us and the second time we have been asked to enforce the same settlement agreement. The first appeal, Ruskin v. AAF-McQuay, Inc., 284 Ga. App. 49 643 SE2d 333 2007, outlines the underlying dispute. Briefly, T.W. Ruskin and McQuay of Georgia, LLP, a partnership in which Ruskin held a share, collectively “Ruskin” entered a business relationship with AAF-McQuay “McQuay”. The parties had an acrimonious split. After litigation ensued, they reached a settlement agreement, but were unable to finalize some of the terms. McQuay filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement, and the trial court referred the disputed terms to a special master for resolution. Id. at 50-51. The special master resolved the issues and “concluded that the trial court should adopt his decisions on all disputed issues as the final judgment enforcing the settlement agreement. The trial court agreed, as the final order reflected.” Id. at 51. That order stated: “Accordingly this order is the FINAL JUDGMENT ENFORCING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT between the parties.” Ruskin appealed. In that first appeal, we concluded that the settlement agreement was enforceable, id. at 52 1, and that the trial court did not err “when it adopted the special master’s findings as a part of its final order.” Id. at 52-53 2. We affirmed the trial court’s judgment, and also affirmed the imposition of a supersedeas bond.
Ruskin now appeals from the trial court’s order finding him in contempt of the order adopting the settlement agreement. He raises essentially the same argument rejected in the earlier appeal: that the special master’s findings were not incorporated into the trial court’s order. He also contends that the trial court’s order and judgment did not expressly order him to comply with the settlement agreement, and that a citation for contempt is therefore in error. Ruskin essentially argues that because the settlement agreement is a contract and not an order of the court, he cannot be held in contempt but only sued again for breach of contract. He made the same argument at the hearing on the motion for contempt.
