Elmer Carlyle Brewton died on January 1, 2006. He did not have a wife or children, but his heirs at law are appellants and appellees who are his surviving siblings and/or the lineal descendants of siblings who predeceased him. Brewton executed a will on March 15, 2000. He executed another will on May 10, 2000 in which appellees were named executors. Twenty months later, he executed a codicil in which he referred to the March will by its date of execution and the names of its witnesses. After Brewton’s death, one of the appellees retrieved the original May will and original codicil from Brewton’s safe deposit box. Both documents were in a single sealed envelope labeled with its contents.1 One of the appellees also located the original March will in a file cabinet in Brewton’s home office. Appellees took the March will and the sealed envelope containing the May will and the codicil to Brewton’s attorney who reviewed all three documents, advised appellees that the March will was not needed, and shredded the March will. Appellees filed a petition to probate the May will along with the codicil and appellants filed a caveat, as well as a motion to dismiss the appellees’ probate petition. The probate court held that the May will and codicil together constituted Brewton’s last will and testament.2 Appellants then filed an appeal in the superior court. Appellees moved for summary judgment, submitting as evidence an affidavit from Brewton’s attorney stating the reference to the March will in the codicil was a scrivener’s error. The superior court granted appellees’ motion for summary judgment, and appellants appealed.
1. The parties agree that the March will was expressly revoked when the May will was executed; however, they disagree as to the effect the codicil had on the March and May wills. Specifically, appellees did not submit a petition to probate the March will, but sought and obtained letters testamentary upon petitioning for the solemn form probate of the May will and codicil. Appellants assert this result was erroneous because they contend the codicil republished the March will and revoked the May will, making the May will a nullity. Also believing the language of the codicil to be unambiguous in its reference to the March will, appellants further contend that it was erroneous for the superior court to allow the introduction of parol evidence, in particular parol evidence which established that the codicil’s reference to the March will was a scrivener’s error made by Brewton’s attorney. We disagree.
