Jamel West, who stands accused in the Superior Court of Fulton County of trafficking in cocaine and other offenses, appeals from the order denying his motion to dismiss the indictment due to the State’s delay in bringing the case to trial.1 West contends that the State failed to persuasively rebut the presumption of prejudice that arose from the 30-month delay between his arrest and his motion to dismiss. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding, after balancing the relevant factors, that the State did not violate West’s constitutional right to a speedy trial, we affirm. An alleged denial of the right of an accused under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to a speedy trial in a criminal prosecution requires a two stage analysis. Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. 52, 55 2 663 SE2d 189 2008, citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U. S. 514 92 SC 2182, 33 LE2d 101 1972, and Doggett v. United States , 505 U. S. 647 112 SC 2686, 120 LE2d 520 1992. In the first stage of the analysis, the court must determine whether the pretrial delay is sufficiently long to be considered “presumptively prejudicial.” Punctuation and footnote omitted. Ruffin v. State , 284 Ga. at 55 2. The pretrial delay is measured from “the accused’s arrest, indictment, or other formal accusation” to the trial or, if the accused files a motion to dismiss the indictment, until the trial court denies the motion. Footnote omitted. Id.2 If the delay has passed the point of presumptive prejudice, “the court must proceed to the second step of the Barker-Doggett analysis, which requires the application of a delicate, context-sensitive, four-factor balancing test to determine whether the accused has been deprived of the right to a speedy trial.” Id.
A Presumptive Prejudice. The record shows that over 34 months elapsed from the date West was arrested to the date the trial court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment. As the State concedes, such a delay in the prosecution of a case raises a threshold presumption of prejudice.3 Accordingly, we must proceed to the second stage of the constitutional speedy trial analysis, the four-factor balancing test.
