Sammy Marshall appeals, pro se, from the trial court’s order dismissing his “Petition to Correct Void Sentence.” He seeks to challenge the 60-year recidivist sentence imposed following his 1994 conviction for two counts of burglary and arson in the first degree. Marshall contends that his recidivist sentence is void, arguing that the trial court erroneously considered his prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and mistakenly believed that it had no discretion to probate or suspend any part of the sentence. We discern no error and affirm. In general, a motion to vacate a sentence is not an appropriate remedy in a criminal case after the term in which the judgment was entered has passed. However, where a sentence is void, the court may resentence the defendant at any time. A sentence is void if the court imposes punishment that the law does not allow. If the judgment is not void, a trial court has no further subject matter jurisdiction outside the term of court and the petition must be dismissed.Citations, punctuation, and footnotes omitted; emphasis in original. Kinsey v. State , 259 Ga. App. 653 1 578 SE2d 269 2003. Here, the record establishes that in 1994, Marshall was convicted of two counts of burglary and arson in the first degree. He was sentenced as a recidivist to 20 years on each count to run consecutively, for a total of 60 years imprisonment. This sentence was within the statutory limits and is not void. Because the state gave notice of its intent to seek recidivist punishment based upon Marshall’s three prior felony convictions, the trial court was required to sentence Marshall as a recidivist pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 a and c.1
1. Contrary to Marshall’s assertion, the trial court did not err in considering for sentencing purposes his prior conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. It is true that the state may not both rely upon a defendant’s prior felony conviction to prove the defendant’s guilt of a convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge and also use that prior conviction in aggravation of punishment. See Arkwright v. State , 275 Ga. App. 375, 376-378 1 620 SE2d 618 2005 the trial court erred in sentencing the defendant as a recidivist based upon a prior felony conviction that the state had already used in the guilt-innocence phase to prove the convicted felon in possession of a firearm charge. Here, however, Marshall’s prior firearm conviction was not used to determine his guilt of the burglary and arson charges, but rather was properly used post-verdict to consider his recidivist sentencing. See Copeland v. State , 269 Ga. App. 424, 425 2 604 SE2d 223 2004. Compare Arkwright , 275 Ga. App. at 376-378 1.