We granted Caroline Pineres’ application to appeal in this contempt action arising out of the parties’ 1991 divorce. 1. We agree with Pineres that the trial court improperly modified the parties’ divorce decree in the context of ruling on the parties’ contempt motions when it shifted final decision-making authority regarding their minor son’s health care to their co-parenting counselor, Dr. Spencer Gelernter. Gallit v. Buckley , 240 Ga. 621, 626 3 242 SE2d 89 1978. “It is well settled that a trial judge has no authority in a contempt proceeding to modify the obligations imposed by the decree. Cits.” Accordingly, we hereby reverse the trial court’s contempt judgment to the extent it grants final decision-making authority to Dr. Gelernter as to the child’s health care.
2. The record establishes that Pineres filed a petition for modification of psychological expenses less than two years after a previous modification of child support was made at her request. See OCGA § 19-6-19 a prohibiting petitions for modification filed by former spouse within two years of order on previous modification petition by same former spouse. On that basis, an award of attorney fees under either subsection a or b of OCGA § 9-15-14 was warranted.1 Haggard v. Board of Regents , 257 Ga. 524 4 c 360 SE2d 566 1987. The record also establishes that George introduced evidence regarding attorney fees incurred in responding to the improper modification petition. See Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Friedenberg , 275 Ga. App. 236 2 d 620 SE2d 463 2005 fee award must be limited to those fees incurred because of sanctionable conduct. Given that this evidence was admitted without objection and was neither challenged nor rebutted by Pineres, the trial court properly exercised its discretion in awarding attorney fees based thereon. See Carson v. Carson , 277 Ga. 335 2 588 SE2d 735 2003. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the $4,100 attorney fee award.
