On appeal from an adjudication of delinquency for terroristic threats, K. J. argues that the evidence was insufficient. We affirm.On appeal, we view the evidence from an adjudicatory hearing in the light most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the juvenile committed the acts charged. The evidence is examined under the standard of Jackson v. Virginia , with all reasonable inferences construed in favor of the juvenile court’s findings.Citations omitted. In the Interest of M. F. , 276 Ga. App. 402, 402-403 1 623 SE2d 234 2005. So viewed, the record shows that a math instructor called the assistant principal at the school K. J. attended and told him that the 14-year-old girl was “out of control.” K. J. then told the instructor a number of times that “if you write me up again, I’m going to get you.” As the instructor escorted K. J. to an administrator’s office, K. J. started pounding her clenched fist into her other hand, exclaiming over and over, “I swear to God, I’m going to get the instructor.” Other teachers heard K. J.’s threats, saw her pounding her fist into her other hand, and confirmed that she was “screaming” and “out of control.” At one point K. J. shouted that she was “going to snap” and that she was “going to get her the instructor.” It took more than 20 minutes for the instructor and other teachers to stop K. J.’s outbursts.
OCGA § 16-11-37 a provides that A person commits the offense of a terroristic threat when he or she threatens to commit any crime of violence . . . with the purpose of terrorizing another. . . . No person shall be convicted under this subsection on the uncorroborated testimony of the party to whom the threat is communicated.The crime of terroristic threat “focuses solely on the conduct of the accused and is completed when the threat is communicated to the victim with the intent to terrorize.” Citation omitted. Boone v. State , 155 Ga. App. 937, 939 2 274 SE2d 49 1980. See Lanthrip v. State , 235 Ga. 10, 12 218 SE2d 771 1975. Moreover, “direct evidence that the threats were made for the purpose of terrorizing another is not necessary if the circumstances surrounding the threats are sufficient for a trier of fact to find the threats were made for such a purpose.” Citations omitted. Id.
