The State appeals pursuant to OCGA § 5-7-1 a 4 from the trial court’s pre-trial order suppressing evidence which John Calhoun Kipple, Jr. contended a police officer illegally obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by patting him down for weapons during a traffic stop of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. We reverse. The pat-down was justified because there was a reasonable basis for the officer to conclude that Kipple was armed and posed a threat to his safety. The police officer lawfully stopped the vehicle in which Kipple was a passenger after observing the vehicle weave erratically in and out of its lane. During the stop, in which the driver was arrested for driving on a suspended license, the officer ordered Kipple to get out of the vehicle. When Kipple exited, the officer asked him if he had any weapons on his person, and Kipple told the officer that he had a knife in a holder on his belt and handed the knife to the officer. To ensure that Kipple had no more weapons on his person, the officer then conducted a pat-down of Kipple’s outer clothing. The officer felt a large hard object in Kipple’s back pocket and asked Kipple if it was his wallet. Kipple said no and told the officer it was “some scales.” The officer asked Kipple for permission to remove the object from his pocket, and Kipple consented and told the officer that he used the scales to weigh jewelry. The officer removed the object, which was in fact scales, and saw that there was a white, crystal-like substance on the scales that appeared to be methamphetamine residue. When the officer asked about the residue, Kipple explained that it was a miniature scale that he used to weigh drywall. During a subsequent search of the vehicle incident to the driver’s arrest, the officer found a container holding a quantity of what appeared to be methamphetamine in the form of the same white, crystal-like substance that the officer saw on the scales. At that point, Kipple and the driver were arrested for possession of the suspected methamphetamine.
1. Kipple was seized by the officer within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer lawfully stopped the vehicle in which he was a passenger. Brendlin v. California , __U. S.__ 127 SC 2400, 2405-2406, 2410, 168 LE2d 132 2007; State v. Williams , 264 Ga. App. 199, 201 590 SE2d 151 2003. As a precautionary measure, the officer was entitled during the stop to order the driver and any passenger to get out of the vehicle without having any suspicion that they posed a threat to the officer’s safety. Brendlin , 127 SC at 2407. At issue here is whether, after Kipple was ordered to get out of the vehicle, the officer was entitled to conduct the pat-down which produced the residue-coated scales. Because an ordinary traffic stop of a vehicle is more akin to an investigative detention under Terry v. Ohio , 392 U. S. 1 88 SC 1868, 20 LE2d 889 1968 than to a formal arrest on probable cause, the Fourth Amendment principles set forth in Terry apply under these circumstances. Williams , 264 Ga. App. at 201. Under Terry, an officer, for his own protection and safety, may conduct a pat-down search of the outer clothing of the driver or any passenger in the vehicle to discover weapons if the officer has a reasonable basis to believe or suspect that such person may be armed. Johnson v. State , 289 Ga. App. 27, 29 656 SE2d 161 2007; Terry , 392 U. S. at 27-30; Ybarra v. Illinois , 444 U. S. 85, 92-94 100 SC 338, 62 LE2d 238 1979; Knowles v. Iowa , 525 U. S. 113, 117-118 119 SC 484, 142 LE2d 492 1998. The issue does not turn on the officer’s subjective belief; rather the issue is whether the officer has objectively reasonable grounds to believe or suspect that the person may be armed. United States v. Holmes , 385 F3d 786, 790 D. C. Cir. 2004; Ohio v. Robinette , 519 U. S. 33, 39 117 SC 417, 136 LE2d 347 1996. Terry does not require that the officer “be absolutely certain that the individual is armed; the issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger.” Terry , 392 U. S. at 27. Accordingly, an officer may perform a protective pat-down under Terry if the officer has reason to believe, based on “specific and articulable facts . . . taken together with rational inferences from those facts,” that the individual is armed. Id. at 21, 27.
