Cedric J. Parks Jr., age five, died as a result of injuries he suffered while riding as a passenger in a 1989 Hyundai Excel automobile which was struck head-on by another automobile. The child’s parents, Peggy and Cedric Parks, brought a product liability and wrongful death action against Hyundai Motor America, Inc. and Hyundai Motor Company jointly referred to as Hyundai.1 The action, which included claims based on negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn, alleged that the center rear passenger seat in the Excel, where the child was seated and wearing the seat belt at the time of the accident, had a defective seat belt system which did not properly restrain the child in the accident and which caused or contributed to the child’s death.2 The Parkses appeal from the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment in favor of Hyundai. For the following reasons, we affirm. 1. Hyundai moved for partial summary judgment on the basis that the Parkses’ product liability action under state law was impliedly preempted in part by Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard FMVSS 208 promulgated by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration NHTSA under the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966 the Safety Act. The purpose of the Safety Act is to reduce injuries and deaths from automobile accidents by promoting safer automobile design, and FMVSS 208 advances that purpose by specifying crash worthiness requirements to protect automobile occupants involved in accidents. Gentry v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. , 238 Ga. App. 785, 788-789 521 SE2d 13 1999. It is undisputed that the version of FMVSS 208 applicable to the 1989 Excel required Hyundai to choose between options of installing a passenger restraint system for the center rear seat with either a lap-only seat belt design or a design with a lap belt and a shoulder belt. It is also undisputed that Hyundai complied with FMVSS 208 by choosing to install a lap-only seat belt for the center rear seat. Based on these facts, we find that, because Hyundai installed one of the passenger restraint system options required by FMVSS 208 —the lap-only seat belt —the trial court correctly ruled that FMVSS 208 impliedly preempted the Parkses’ action to the extent it claimed the Excel was defective under state law because it had a lap-only seat belt instead of a lap/shoulder seat belt or some other type of passenger seat restraint.
Under Article VI, Clause 2, of the United States Constitution the Supremacy Clause, rights created by Congress in treaties, statutes, or regulations have priority when they conflict with state law. Even though the Safety Act under which FMVSS 208 was promulgated did not expressly state the extent to which it preempted the state law claims at issue, where Congress has not expressly defined the extent to which its enactment preempts state law, Congressional intent to impliedly preempt state law can be found when there is an “actual conflict” between state and federal law. Geier v. American Honda Motor Co. , 529 U. S. 861, 868-874 120 SC 1913, 146 LE2d 914 2000. An “actual conflict” supporting implied preemption exists when the state law “prevents or frustrates the accomplishment of a federal objective” or “makes it ‘impossible’ for private parties to comply with both state and federal law.” Id. at 873. The regulatory and rule-making history of FMVSS 208 shows a comprehensive regulatory scheme in which the NHTSA considered technological constraints, child safety concerns, and cost efficiency issues applicable to restraint systems in the rear center seat and adopted a policy that expressly required Hyundai to choose between installing a lap-only seat belt or a lap/shoulder seat belt in the rear center seat of the 1989 Excel. See Carden v. General Motors Corp. , 509 F3rd 227, 231-232 5th Cir. 2007 discussing the history of FMVSS 208 as it relates to restraints in the rear center seat position during the period applicable to the 1989 Excel in the present case; Roland v. General Motors Corp. , 881 NE2d 722 Ind. App. 2008. Any action by the Parkses that seeks to impose liability on Hyundai for choosing to install a lap-only seat belt authorized by FMVSS 208 conflicts with and frustrates the policy of the Safety Act and is preempted. Carden , 509 F3d at 230-232; Griffith v. General Motors Corp. , 303 F3d 1276-1282 11th Cir. 2002. It follows that FMVSS 208 preempted: 1 any claim that the 1989 Excel was defective under state law whether characterized by the Parkses as based on negligence or strict liability because Hyundai failed to install a lap/shoulder seat belt or some other restraint system as an alternative to the lap-only seat belt, and 2 any claim that Hyundai failed to warn about a danger resulting from a preempted claim. Id.
