Hook v. Bergen

The plaintiff was estopped from seeking further judicial review of the trial court's October 14, 2005 order upholding the validity of 1986 and 1990 orders amending her divorce decree, inter alia, to award her attorney a 1/3-interest in a real estate venture as attorneys' fees, since the plaintiff filed an application for discretionary review of the October 2005 order and the Supreme Court denied the application on its merits.

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In April 2005, Laura Hook filed a complaint for, inter alia, declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and fraud against her former attorney, Joseph Bergen.1 In Case No. A07A0541, Hook appeals from the trial court’s August 22, 2006 order granting Bergen’s motion for summary judgment and the denial of her cross-motion for summary judgment. In a cross-appeal, Case No. A07A0542, Bergen appeals from the court’s denial of his motion to dismiss Hook’s response in opposition to his motion for summary judgment, as well as Hook’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Finding no error, we affirm. The undisputed evidence of record shows the following facts. In 1979, Hook hired Bergen to represent her in an ongoing property dispute arising from her 1973 divorce. In a December 1986 order, the trial court amended Hook’s divorce decree and awarded Hook her ex-husband’s interest in a real estate joint venture. In the same order, the court awarded Bergen one third of Hook’s newly-acquired interest in the venture as attorney fees for representing Hook in the proceedings.

Three years later, Bergen represented Hook in further proceedings concerning the divorce decree and Hook’s interest in the joint venture. These proceedings resulted in a 1990 order which amended the divorce decree. In that order, the court clarified Hook’s interest in the joint venture. The court also specifically approved of the legal services contract between Bergen and Hook, and awarded Bergen one third of “all distributions of profits and other monies” that Hook was entitled to receive under the order, based upon the court’s finding that Bergen’s legal services to Hook “fully justify this attorney fee award.” Hook and Bergen both signed the order, stating that they approved the form and content of the order. Bergen’s representation of Hook ended in 1990. Neither Hook nor Bergen moved to set aside the 1990 order within three years, pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-60 d and f.

Hook v. Bergen

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