Following a bench trial, Darlene Dunbar appeals her conviction of driving under the influence by reason of alcohol concentration of .08 grams or more, contending that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress, because 1 the arresting officer lacked reasonable articulable suspicion justifying the initial traffic stop, and 2 the arresting officer failed to read the implied consent notice in a timely manner.1 For the reasons that follow, we affirm. While the trial court’s findings as to disputed facts in a ruling on a motion to suppress will be reviewed to determine whether the ruling was clearly erroneous, where the evidence is uncontroverted and no question regarding the credibility of witnesses is presented, the trial court’s application of the law to undisputed facts is subject to de novo appellate review. Citation omitted. Vansant v. State .2 So viewed, the record shows that, while stopped on the side of the road at approximately 7 p.m., an officer observed Dunbar driving around a curve on the wrong side of the road, nearly leaving the pavement on the other side. The officer pulled onto the road, followed Dunbar for approximately a mile, and executed a traffic stop. When the officer asked Dunbar for her driver’s license, she explained that she did not have one, but she was driving because she and her passenger had been drinking and he was too drunk to drive. As the officer spoke further with Dunbar, she admitted “I know I’m DUI,” and the officer gave her a field alco-sensor test, which registered positive. The officer then told Dunbar she was under arrest for DUI, handcuffed her, and placed her in the back of his police cruiser. After securing Dunbar and calling a tow truck, the officer interviewed the passenger, patted him down, asked him about the presence of weapons or open containers of alcohol, and began inventorying Dunbar’s vehicle. During the inventory, the officer found containers with a strong odor of alcohol.
When the tow truck arrived, the officer read Dunbar the implied consent notice in accordance with OCGA § 40-5-67.1 b 2, and Dunbar consented to a breath test. The officer then took her to the sheriff’s office, where a breath test was administered, yielding alcohol concentrations of .147 and .150 grams. Dunbar was charged with DUI per se,3 DUI less safe,4 driving without a license,5 and weaving on a roadway.6 Prior to trial, Dunbar moved to suppress the evidence from the traffic stop and subsequent breath test, which motion was denied. After a bench trial, Dunbar was convicted of DUI per se and driving without a license,7 giving rise to this appeal of the DUI per se conviction.
