Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics Inc.

The plaintiffs clearly objected to the trial court's recharge on the grounds that the recharge was confusing, misleading and contrary to the law both before and after the trial court gave the recharge and they were not required to submit an alternate charge to preserve their objection.

Thank you for sharing!

Your article was successfully shared with the contacts you provided.

We granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics , 277 Ga. App. 722 627 SE2d 431 2006, to determine whether that court properly applied induced error in its analysis of appellants’ claim of substantial error in the jury charge. See OCGA § 5-5-24 c. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. Appellants Cody Pearson and his parents, Tamara and Andrew Pearson, filed a civil action against appellee Tippmann Pneumatics, Inc. and 16-year-old Ashton Ballesteros seeking damages for personal injuries Cody received in a shooting accident. Cody was injured when Ballesteros, mistakenly believing the safety mechanism was engaged, pointed a paint ball gun at Cody and pulled the trigger, striking Cody in the eye. Appellants alleged in their complaint that the paint ball gun manufactured by Tippmann was defective and unreasonably dangerous because the gun’s safety mechanism was not properly marked to indicate whether the gun was in the “safe” or “fire” position and that both Tippmann and Ballesteros had been negligent. During trial, appellants negotiated a settlement with Ballesteros, and the case went to the jury solely on the issue of Tippmann’s liability.

While deliberating, the jury submitted a written question asking the court to explain proximate cause in “layman’s terms” because they were “confused as to how a natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by other causes, is to be construed.”1 The jury attached to the note the court’s original charge on proximate cause, underlining language in the charge that distinguished proximate cause from “remote” by defining proximate cause as “that which stands last in causation; not necessarily in time or place but in causal connection.”

Pearson v. Tippmann Pneumatics Inc.

The plaintiffs clearly objected to the trial court's recharge on the grounds that the recharge was confusing, misleading and contrary to the law both before and after the trial court gave the recharge and they were not required to submit an alternate charge to preserve their objection.

Share with Email

Thank you for sharing!

Trending Stories

More From ALM

Subscribe to Daily Report