This case involves a dispute between adjoining landowners over title to approximately six acres of land located in Forsyth County, Georgia. Appellants Richard, Matthew, and Amanda Pirkle filed suit against appellee Turner, alleging slander of title, tortious interference with contract, and trespass. Turner answered and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment affirming his title to the disputed property. During the pendency of the action, the Pirkles deeded the disputed property to appellant Cox, and Cox was joined as a plaintiff in the action. In Pirkle v. Turner , 277 Ga. 308 588 SE2d 733 2003, this Court affirmed the trial court’s issuance of an interlocutory injunction against Cox as well as its finding that two deeds in the Pirkles’ chain of title, upon which appellants relied to establish their claims, were void as a matter of law because the property descriptions therein were too indefinite. A jury trial was subsequently held, and the jury returned special verdicts rejecting appellants’ claims of title by perfect equity1 or by actual adverse possession and affirming Turner’s title to a designated portion of the disputed property by constructive adverse possession. Judgment was thereupon entered, awarding fee simple to the designated property to Turner and ordering the cancellation of all deeds and plats recorded on behalf of appellants to the extent they cast a cloud on Turner’s title. This appeal ensued. 1. Appellants continue to challenge the trial court’s finding, affirmed by this Court, that the deeds relied upon by appellants were insufficient as a matter of law. Appellants contend that “new facts and evidence” were presented at trial that rectified the vagueness in the deeds and would thus have proven the appellants’ superior title to the disputed property. However, the finding that the deeds were invalid is binding as the law of the case and is not open for us to revisit. See OCGA § 9-11-60 h “any ruling by the Supreme Court . . . in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court”. Though appellants claim that new evidence warrants fresh consideration of this issue, there is no amount of new evidence that could change this Court’s finding that the deeds bore an insufficient description of the property to be conveyed, this being a question of law unaffected by circumstances extrinsic to the deeds themselves. See generally Wisener v. Gulledge , 251 Ga. 419 306 SE2d 642 1983.
2. Appellants also contend that the trial court erred by allowing the jury to make decisions in equity. As an initial matter, we note that it was appellant Cox who requested a jury in this case, and thus to the extent appellants’ complaint relates to the very empaneling of a jury, this complaint is meritless. See Henley v. Henley , 217 Ga. 612 124 SE2d 86 1962. Appellants appear also to contend that the jury overstepped its fact-finding role in determining that appellants did not acquire the disputed property via actual adverse possession or under the doctrine of perfect equity and conversely that Turner had acquired the disputed property via constructive adverse possession. Adverse possession is usually a mixed question of law and fact. The judge decides whether, as a matter of law, the facts alleged by the claimant are sufficient to constitute a claim of adverse possession. The jury decides whether the claimant has presented sufficient evidence to establish the elements of adverse possession. Footnote omitted. Proctor v. Heirs of Jernigen , 273 Ga. 29 2 538 SE2d 36 2000. Here, the court properly instructed the jury on the elements of adverse possession as well as the other theories of recovery and defenses thereto, and the jury returned a special verdict indicating it had found sufficient evidence to support Turner’s claim of constructive adverse possession and insufficient evidence to support appellants’ claim to title by actual adverse possession or perfect equity. Under these circumstances, we find no error.
