Charged with two counts of arson in the second degree for damaging a building and a dumpster by fire, Thomas George Hitchcock filed a demand for speedy trial. When the case was called for trial, the State objected that it did not receive adequate notice of the trial date pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule 32.1, and announced that it was not ready to proceed with trial. The trial court disagreed and granted Hitchcock’s motion to dismiss the indictment for want of prosecution. The State now appeals from that ruling. We find no error and therefore affirm. Hitchcock was indicted on June 13, 2006, and charged with two counts of arson. On August 28, 2006, he filed a demand for speedy trial.1 Therefore, the State had to try Hitchcock no later than November 3, 2006, or he would be absolutely discharged of the offenses by operation of law. See OCGA § 17-7-170 b when demand for speedy trial is made, defendant must be tried during the term the demand is made or during the next succeeding court term.
On Friday, September 8, 2006, the State received notice of the trial calendar setting Hitchcock’s trial for the morning of Tuesday, September 12, 2006. On the morning of trial, Hitchcock announced that he was ready for trial, but the State announced “not ready.” The prosecutor explained: We object to the call of this case based on lack of notice under Uniform Superior Court Rule 32.1. I did receive notice . . . at 3:30 last Friday, the 8th, for the call of the case this morning, . . . I have seen this case one time previously. And that was about two weeks ago. I think I would be derelict in my duty in going forward on a case that I know that I’m not ready on. So we would avail ourselves with the objection of lack of notice at this time. The State offered no explanation of why it was not ready or how it would be prejudiced by going forward. The trial court responded: “it’s my understanding that a speedy trial trumps all notices and therefore when the State indicts a case, the State says that it has all of its ducks in a row and it has enough evidence to try the person. And when the State is served with a speedy trial demand . . . they’re put on notice that they are subject to being called in to try the case.” The court stated further: “as a practical matter, State, . . . I don’t like, . . . forcing people to trial. But when I’ve got no choice by the speedy trial demands and I’m having to juggle all of these things —and I can’t wait until two weeks before the end of . . . the September/October term . . . I’ve got to reach them.”
