Following the termination of his parental rights by the Juvenile Court of Whitfield County, Steve Sexton appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. Sexton, who was incarcerated in Tennessee and received the petition and summons by certified mail, argued, among other things, that he received insufficient service, contending that OCGA § 15-11-96 c and OCGA § 9-11-4 required that out-of-state parties in termination proceedings be served personally. The Court of Appeals affirmed see In the Interest of C. S. , 279 Ga. App. 831632 SE2d 665 2006, and we granted certiorari to determine whether the delivery by certified mail to Sexton of the termination petition and the summons constituted sufficient service. See OCGA § 15-11-39.1 and OCGA § 15-11-96. For the reasons that follow, we reverse. OCGA § 15-11-96 c applies specifically to service in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, and provides that “the summons shall be served at least 30 days before the time set for the hearing, and a copy of the petition shall be served together with the summons and shall be made in the manner provided in Code Section 9-11-4, relating to service in civil practice.” Emphasis supplied. In this connection, while personal service is not always required on out-of-state parties pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-4, the statute makes clear that service on an out-of-state party with a known address by certified mail alone is insufficient where, as here, the party has not waived service. See OCGA § § 9-11-4 e 7 and f 1 A; Lee v. Pace , 252 Ga. 546, 547 2 315 SE2d 417 1984. Under the circumstances of this case, OCGA § 9-11-4 required that Sexton be served personally. See OCGA § 9-11-4 e 7. That was not done here.1
Because OCGA § 15-11-96 c relates specifically to service in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings, the trial court’s reliance on the service provisions of OCGA § 15-11-39.1, a statute dealing with service in juvenile court proceedings generally, was misplaced. Garden Hills Civic Assn., Inc. v. MARTA , 273 Ga. 280, 284 5 539 SE2d 811 2000 “For purposes of statutory interpretation, a specific statute will prevail over a general statute, absent any indication of a contrary legislative intent” citations and punctuation omitted. See also OCGA § 15-11-104 statutory provisions relating generally to juvenile court proceedings do not apply where in conflict with provisions relating specifically to termination of parental rights proceedings. The general provisions of OCGA § 15-11-39.1 a that would allow an out-of-state party in a termination proceeding to be served by certified mail alone cannot trump the clear and specific provisions of OCGA § § 15-11-96 c and 9-11-4 that would deem such a method of service to be insufficient. OCGA § 15-11-39.1 simply does not apply in this case.
