Trinity Universal Life Insurance Company brought an action against Barbara Sanders and John Sweet seeking to recover for property damage resulting from an automobile collision involving Sanders, Sweet, and Trinity’s insured, Jeanne Ravan. Sanders moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the statute of limitations expired before she was personally served and that the action was barred by res judicata. The trial court denied her motions, and Sanders appeals. Because we find that the action is barred by res judicata, we reverse. On appeal, we conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss.1 Our role is “to determine whether the allegations of the complaint, when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and with all doubts resolved in the plaintiff’s favor, disclose with certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of provable facts.”2 So viewed, the complaint asserts that on January 16, 2002, Ravan’s vehicle and horse trailer were damaged in a collision caused by the allegedly negligent driving of Sweet and Sanders. On June 18, 2002, Ravan, acting pro se, sued Sanders in the Magistrate Court of Gwinnett County seeking to recover $4,023.20 for damage to her horse trailer and the cost of renting a horse trailer while hers was disabled. Judgment was entered in favor of Sanders on August 22, 2002.
On January 12, 2006, Trinity filed a complaint in its own name against both Sanders and Sweet seeking to recover for property damage to Ravan’s vehicle for which it paid $16,738.00. On January 16, 2006, the sheriff’s department attempted service on Sanders at an address in Lawrenceville, but found the residence empty. On January 26, 2006, service was made by leaving the complaint with a person at what Trinity alleged was Sanders’s residence in Decatur, Georgia. Sanders filed an answer alleging improper service on February 13, 2006, and was then served on March 21, 2006, at a new address provided by her counsel.
