The father of two-year-old K. D. appeals from the juvenile court’s termination of his parental rights.1 In several related enumerations of error, he complains that the trial court’s findings of fact were not supported by clear and convincing evidence. We disagree and affirm the court’s order. A termination of parental rights case involves a two-step analysis. First, there must be a finding of parental misconduct or inability, which requires clear and convincing evidence that: 1 the child is deprived; 2 the lack of proper parental care or control is the cause of the deprivation; 3 the cause of the deprivation is likely to continue; and 4 continued deprivation is likely to cause serious physical, mental, emotional, or moral harm to the child. OCGA § 15-11-94 b 4 A i-iv. If these four factors exist, then the court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in the best interest of the child, considering the child’s physical, mental, emotional, and moral condition and needs, including the need for a secure, stable home. OCGA § 15-11-94 a. In reviewing a juvenile court’s decision to terminate parental rights, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s disposition and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found by clear and convincing evidence that the natural parent’s rights to custody should be terminated. In so doing, we do not weigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses; rather, we defer to the juvenile court’s factfinding and affirm unless the appellate standard is not met. Footnotes omitted. In the Interest of T. L. , 279 Ga. App. 7, 10 630 SE2d 154 2006. Viewed in favor of the juvenile court’s ruling, the evidence shows the following facts. When K. D. was born prematurely on June 20, 2004, he weighed less than four pounds and was considered “medically fragile.” At the time of K. D.’s birth, both the mother and the child’s putative father, the appellant herein, were 18 years old. The parents were not married, and the appellant was not listed as the father on K. D.’s birth certificate. When K. D. was five days old, the Lowndes County Department of Family and Children Services “the Department” obtained custody of K. D. pursuant to an emergency shelter care order, which was based upon a showing that the mother had no home or means of support and that she had already lost custody of another child due to neglect.2 According to two Department employees, K. D.’s mother reported that K. D. had been born prematurely due to a domestic dispute between the mother and the appellant, during which the appellant pushed the mother down, causing her to go into early labor. The Department initially placed K. D. in a group home that specialized in caring for medically fragile infants, then placed him in a foster home a few months later.
On July 27, 2004, the court conducted a deprivation hearing, during which it found that neither the mother nor the appellant had a job or a stable home, the appellant was not paying child support, and the mother had already lost custody of her older child. As a result, the court found that K. D. was deprived and entered an order granting custody of K. D. to the Department. Although the appellant had not legitimated K. D., he attended the deprivation hearing. During that hearing, the court informed the appellant that he had to legitimate K. D. if he were interested in visiting with or obtaining custody of the child. According to a Department case manager, the appellant showed no interest in obtaining custody of K. D. at that point. The record shows that the appellant failed to legitimate K. D., register on the Putative Father Registry as a possible father of K. D., pay any child support, pay for the child’s health care, or pay the medical expenses associated with the child’s birth. A DNA test in October 2004 confirmed that the appellant was the biological father of K. D.
